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PRIVACY, AUTONOMY, AND DIGNITY IN THE PRISON:
A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY CONCERNING CONSTITUTIONAL
ASPECTS OF THE DEGRADATION PROCESS
IN OUR PRISONS
RICHARD G. SINGR
INTRODUCTION

T

he title of this essay will cause either titillation or disbelief on
the part of anyone who has had any occasion to concern himself with prison. For the concepts of privacy and prison are
antithetical beyond comprehension: the prison is, almost by definition, a place where the resident has lost his privacy, and his
identity, and has become a number. Indeed, it has long been
recognized that the entire process of prison is designed to destroy
the last remnants of the dignity of the individual:
The recruit comes into the establishment with a conception
of himself made possible by certain stable social arrangements in
his home world. Upon entrance, he is immediately stripped of the
support provided by these arrangements. In the accurate language
of some of our oldest total institutions, he begins a series of abasements, degradations, humiliations, and profanations of self. His self

is systematically, if often unintentionally, mortified. He begins
some radical shifts in his moral career, a career composed of the
progressive changes that occur in the beliefs that he has concerning
himself and significant others.
The processes by which a person's self is mortified are fairly
standard in total institutions, analysis of these processes can help
us to see the arrangements that ordinary establishments must guarantee if members are to preserve their civilian selves.
Admission procedures and obedience tests may be elaborated
into a form of initiation that has been called "the welcome,"
where staff or inmates, or both, go out of their way to give the
recruit a clear notion of his plight. As part of this rite of passage
he may be called by a term such as "fish" or "swab," which tells
him that he is merely an inmate, and, what is more, that he has a
special low status even in his low group.
The admission procedure can be characterized as a leaving off
and a taking on, with the midpoint marked by physical nakedness.
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Cincinnati. A.B., Amherst College, 1963;
J.D., University of Chicago, 1966; LL.M., Columbia University, 1971.
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Leaving off of course entails a dispossession of property, important
because persons invest self feelings in their possessions. Perhaps the
most significant of these possessions is not physical at all, one's full
name; whatever one is thereafter called, loss of one's name can be
a great curtailment of the self.
Once the inmate is stripped of his possessions, at least some
replacements must be made by the establishment, but these take
the form of standard issue, uniform in character and uniformly
distributed. These substitute possessions are clearly marked as
really belonging to the institution and in some cases are recalled
at regular intervals to be, as it were, disinfected of identifications.
With objects that can be used up-for example, pencils-the inmate
may be required to return the remnants before obtaining a reissue.
Failure to provide inmates with individual lockers and periodic
searches and confiscations of accumulated personal property reinforce property dispossession. Religious orders have appreciated the
implications for self of such separation from belongings. Inmates
may be required to change their cells once a year so as not to become attached to them.1
The process of dehumanization and degradation does not, of
course, end with the introduction into the institution. Every day,
in every way, the prison reinforces the inmate's image of himself

as that of something less than a human. In many prisons even
today, notwithstanding a raft of court 2 and administrative,, decisions to the contrary, mail to the inmate is read, his packages
opened. Information in the letters is occasionally transmitted to
law enforcement officers interested in the contents. In addition to
the search of his mail, the inmate will frequently be the object of
body searches. Although these are usually performed before an
1. E.

GOFFMAN,

ASYLUMS 14, 18-19 (1961). See also C. CLEMMER, TIlE PlSON CONI-

eUNITY 100 (1940).

Judge Bazelon has suggested that the need to degrade the prisoner comes not only
from the desire of prison personnel for an efficiently run institution, but inheres in our
-criminal law: "What I am suggesting is that the criminal serves as a scapegoat. And this
as much as anything is impeding obvious and sorely needed reform in the treatment of
'offenders." Bazelon, The Imperative to Punish, ATLANTIC, July, 1960, at 44.
2. All the mail censorship cases are collected in R. SINGER, PISONER'S LEGAL RIGHTs: A
BIaLIOCRAPHY OF CASES AND ARTLCr
(1972).
3. In the past year, the prison systems of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Washington,
Virginia, West Virginia, and New York City have virtually abolished mail censorship.
Ohio has abolished censorship of first class mail, and a Citizens' Task Force has recommended abolishing all censorship. Atmore Prison in Alabama has agreed to no censorship. Lake v. Lee, 329 F. Supp. 196 (S.D. Ala. 1971). A California statute specifically
provides for free access to all material available at news stands. CAL. PENAL CODE § 2600
(West 1970). But that, of course, does not mean that it is always followed. See Payne v.
'Whitmore, 325 F. Supp. 1191 (N.D. Cal. 1971).
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inmate in segregation can exercise or shower, 4 or see a visitor,
they are sometimes conducted at random through the population,
in the yard. They can, and the non-random searches almost inevitably do, include a rectal inspection. The thought of a rectal
examination was so demeaning to Martin Sostre, a militant black
kept in solitary confinement for over one year, that he refused to
take his one hour of exercise per day because he would be subjected to that procedure.5
Searches of cells and beds of inmates can occur at any time,
outside the presence of the inmate. His books, pictures, personal
belongings (assuming he may keep any of those in his cell in the
first place) may be treated with utter contempt. Far too often, he
will return to the cell to find either (a) something there that
wasn't there before; or (b) something missing. While no one
would deny that officials must have some mechanism for warding
off possible security problems, and for discovering truly dangerous contraband, this gross invasion of the privacy of the individual
is unwarranted in many situations.
I.

THE LAW TODAY

The first, and thus far the only, clear recognition of the right
of fourth amendment privacy in prison has come in the area of
mail censorship. Most of the cases, of course, have been decided
on the basis of the first amendment right to uncensored mail,6 the
easiest and most obvious path. And that alone indicates a meaningful victory for the protection of the dignity of the inmate for it
acknowledges that he is a "person" within the fourteenth amendment, a recognition bitterly contested a century ago.'
4. See note 21, infra.
5. Sostre v. Rockefeller, 312 F. Supp. 863 (S.D.N.Y. 1970). The Ohio Citizens' Task
Force on Corrections, Final Report C39 (1972), discussed "skin searches":
shakedowns and skin searches are inherently humiliating and engender bitterness
and resentment. In a cell shakedown, the inmates' possessions are often knocked
to the floor and trampled. It is true that thorough searches of person and premises are necessary for the protection of the institutional community. Nevertheless,
the basic principles of human dignity need to be observed.
6. See materials in R. SINGER, supra, note 2.
7. A favorite quote from the nineteenth century to show the status of the prisoner
and the way in which the law regarded him comes from Ruffin v. Commonwealth, 62

Va. 790, 796 (1871):
A convicted felon, whom the law in its humanity punishes by confinement
in the penitentiary instead of with death, is subject while undergoing that punish-
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In Palmigiano v. Travisono,8 however, the court, in dictum,
recognized the potential application of the fourth amendment to
mail:
Though this Court has focused mainly on the issue before it as
it relates to the First Amendment, it is of the opinion that the conduct of the ACI officials of indiscriminately opening and reading
all prisoner mail including that of unconvicted awaiting trial inmates, whether the same be from the inmates or members of the
free society, is a violation of the Fourth Amendment. This cannot
be condoned nor allowed to continue, though by necessity the full
sweep of the Fourth Amendment obviously cannot apply in a prison
or jail context. It is this Court's opinion that the right to be free
from unreasonable searches and seizures is one of the rights retained by prisoners subject, of course, to such curtailment as may
be made necessary by the purposes of confinement and the requirements of security. Like all things there must be a point of beginning and in this area of evolving law, where its expansion must be
tailored to the peculiarities of the prison environment, this case
offers as such a point these guidelines for the censorship of mail,
which in my opinion, satisfy the mandate of the Fourth Amendment as it may apply to a penal institution and are applicable for
the purposes of this motion. I feel compelled to comment on the
Fourth Amendment waiver signed by prisoners at the time of commitment. In exchange for mail "privileges" ACI officials require
from each inmate his signature to a written statement authorizing
them to censor his mail. It is this Court's -view that such "authorization" under the inherently coercive circumstances under which
it is given is without effect and cannot operate as a waiver or consent under the Fourth Amendment to the opening and reading of
all of his mail. 9
The suggestion seems eminently correct, since, at least for
incoming mail, there would seem to be no obvious difficulty in
obtaining a warrant, much like a wire-tap warrant, authorizing
continuing scrutiny of the mail of certain inmates whom the ad-

ministration has good reason to consider worthy of surveillance.
Nonetheless, the great weight of authority is contrary to the

Palmigiano suggestion. In Stroud v. United States,10 the Supreme Court upheld the right of prison officials to use as evidence in
ment, to all the laws the legislature in its wisdom may enact ....
being, he is .

.

. the slave of the State.

8. 317 F. Supp. 776 (D.R.I. 1970).
9. Id. at 791-92.
10. 251 U.S. 15 (1919), rehearing denied, 251 U.S. 380 (1920).

For the time
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later court proceedings admissions made by an inmate in letters
found in his cell or passed on for mailing. Recently, the Stroud
rule has been followed by the Ninth 1 and Tenth 12 Circuits. In
the latter case, the inmate's correspondence to other inmates,
which he gave to an "orderly" to transmit, was taken instead to
the warden's office and read, and the evidence used against him in
his trial for second degree murder. The federal court, in allowing
the use of the evidence, declared that "The messages in question
here came into the possession of the penitentiary officials under
established practices reasonably designed to promote the discipline of the institution." 13

The rulings in these latter cases have purported to find support in Lanza v. New York, 14 where the Court affirmed a contempt conviction when the defendant refused to answer questions
put to him by a state legislative investigative committee. The
defendant's chief contention was that the questions were based
upon information gathered from a monitored conversation in the
visiting room of a New York jail. From the fact that the Court did
not overthrow the contempt citation, it is often argued that the
Court held that conversations in jails were not constitutionally
protected. But Lanza does not support the proposition suggested,
for several reasons: (1) there was no majority opinion; (2) only
seven Justices took part; (3) the plurality opinion carefully and
specifically rested its decision on the fact that some of the questions posed did not derive from the conversation:
[T]he record shows that the committee had other independent
information which could have occasioned the petitioner's interrogation. In short, we conclude that the ultimate constitutional claim
asserted in this case, whatever its merits, is simply not tendered by
this record. 15

11. United States v. Wilson, 447 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1971).
12. Denson v. United States, 424 F.2d 329 (10th Cir. 1970).
13. Id. at 330-31. See also Cox v. Crouse, 376 F.2d 824 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389
U.S. 865 (1967); Hayes v. United States, 367 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1966); In re Bull, 123 F.
Supp. 389 (D. Nev. 1954); Green v. Maine, 113 F. Supp. 253 (D. Me. 1953); Baker v. State
202 So. 2d 563 (Fla. 1967); Ellis v. State, 227 Miss. 440, 86 So. 2d 330 (1956); State v.
Johnson, 456 S.W.2d 1 (Mo. 1970) (dictum); Bloeth v. Cyrta, 39 Misc. 2d 1039, 242 N.Y.
S.2d 307 (Suffolk County Ct. 1963)'.
14. 370 U.S. 139 (1962).
15. Id. at 147. Mr. Chief Justice Warren, in a separate opinion refused to be put off
so easily, particularly in light of the controversy which the practice had stirred:
The New York Appellate Division termed the action at the jail 'reprehensible
and offensive,' People v. Lanza, 10 App. Div. 2d 315, 318, 199 N.Y.S.2d 598, 601;

673
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Furthermore, several post-Lanza developments cast even
greater doubt upon the assertion that inmates lose their rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures of communications
while in prison. In Katz v. United States 16 the Court spelled out
the protections which the fourth amendment gave in terms of
privacy, and rejected the old "constitutionally protected area"
jargon which had formed the backdrop for many of the earlier
cases. Although the Court did say that the fourth amendment
"cannot be translated into a general constitutional 'right to privacy,' " it also made pellucid that prior concepts of lack of protection were not binding on the Court, under this new view.
Thus, pre-Katz cases upholding monitoring of jail conversation
against challenges of invasion of privacy would seem to be of dubious validity. In People v. Morgan,17 for example, the court
earlier the court had called it 'atrocious and inexcusable,' Lanza v. New York
State Joint Legislative Committee, 3 App. Div. 2d 531, 533, 162 N.Y.S.2d 467,
470; also 'flagrant and unprecedented,' Matter of Reuter, 4 App. Div. 2d 252,
255, 164 N.Y.S.2d 534, 538. In the Court of Appeals it was characterized as a 'gross
wrong,' Lanza v. New York State Joint Legislative Committee, 3 N.Y.2d 92, 101,
164 N.Y.S.2d 9, 16, 143 N.E.2d 772, 777 (dissenting opinion), and counsel for the
Joint Committee made no effort to justify or excuse the action, but on the contrary himself called it 'repulsive and repugnant,' ibid. The Governor of New
York termed unchecked eavesdropping 'unwholesome and dangerous,' McKinney's
1958 Session Laws of New York, 1837; and the Chairman of the New York Joint
Legislative Committee on Privacy of Communications called the incident "deplor.
able" and reported that it had "brought forth a storm of protest from lawyers,
some of whom had not previously been audibly concerned [with] . . . efforts to
protect the people's right of privacy." Report of the New York Joint Legislative
Committee on Privacy of Communications, Legislative Document (1958) No. 9,
25. It has been reported that a New York trial court judge found it necessary to
release a prisoner without bail so that he would be able to consult his attorney,
the judge not being able to feel confident after this incident that there was any
jail in the State where the prisoner and his lawyers could be secure against electronic eavesdropping. Comment, 27 Fordham L. Rev. 390, 394, n. 35. The most
striking indication of the degree to which the people of the State of New York
were shocked by the incident was the enactment of Article 73 of the Penal Law
of New York, making it a felony to do what the officials in this case did. And
finally the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court, affirmed by the New York
Court of Appeals, reduced the bizarre and unprecedented sentence of ten years
for contempt of court to one year.
Id. at 149-50.
16. 389 U.S. 347 (1968).
17. 197 Cal. App. 2d 90, 16 Cal. Rptr. 838 (4th Dist. 1962), cert. denied, 370 U.S.
965 (1962). In Morgan, the court explained its ruling this way: "A man detained in jail
cannot reasonably expect to enjoy the privacy afforded to a person in free society. His
lack of privacy is a necessary adjunct to his imprisonment." Id. at 93, 16 Cal. Rptr. at
840. Even were that so, and the thesis of this article is that it is far less so than supposed, this would still not justify listening in on conversations which he should reason-
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allowed the use of a conversation between defendant and his
sister, tape recorded as they used the jail private intercom system,
the only available means of communicating. The court relied on
two theories: (1) electric eavesdropping without trespass was not
prohibited by the fourth amendment; (2) since officials could
censor or stop mail, any communication was subject to inspection,
eavesdropping, and use. Both premises are now in serious
doubt.18 Nevertheless, the courts continue to admit such evidence,"0 one of the most recent examples being the use of such
information against Susan Denise Atkins, one of the "Manson
family" ultimately convicted in California. -0
able expect to be private. For other cases upholding use of similar information, see
People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr. 424 (1963); People v. Ross,
236 Cal. App. 2d 364, 46 Cal. Rptr. 41 (2d Dist. 1965); People v. Stadnick, 207 Cal. App.
2d 767, 25 Cal. Rptr. 30 (2d Dist. 1962); People v. Hughes, 203 Cal. App. 2d 598, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 668 (lst Dist. 1962).
18. See supra notes 2 and 15.
19. See, e.g., People v. Apodaca, 252 Cal. App. 2d 698, 60 Cal. Rptr. 782 (2d Dist.
1967).
20. N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1970, at 12, col. 4. Nonetheless, the practice of using any
information gathered in these situations against the prisoner in future trial proceedings
has generated much heat. In People v. Lopez, 60 Cal. 2d 223, 384 P.2d 16, 32 Cal. Rptr.
424 (1963), the California Supreme Court held admissible statements which an inmate
made to a police agent placed in his cell as a deception. In People v. Miller, 245 Cal.
App. 2d 112, 53 Cal. Rptr. 720 (4th Dist. 1966), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted,
392 U.S. 616 (1968), however, the court chastised the police for this practice, calling it
"indefensible," but finding that there was no indication of prejudice in connection with
the particular information admitted at trial. Other courts, however, apparently agree
with the Lopez case. See White v. Commonwealth, 301 Ky. 228, 191 S.W.2d 244 (1945);
Commonwealth v. Goodwin, 186 Pa. 218, 40 A. 412 (1898).
The issue was posed to the Supreme Court in Miller v. California, 392 U.S. 616
(1968), but the Court dismissed the writ of certiorari as improvidently granted. Dissenting, Mr. Justice Marshall, joined by three other members of the Court, excoriated the
practice:
Fisk was not put in the cell to discuss the weather, to console petitioner, or
merely to provide her with companionship. Her presence itself was an inducement to speak, and an inducement by a police agent. While petitioner's statements to her were not obtained by coercive means, they certainly were not given,
in light of the deception, through a knowing and intelligent waiver of petitioner's
rights.
Furthermore, it is clear on this record that Fisk was planted in petitioner's
cell in order to subvert her right to counsel, with the express purpose of attempting to obtain evidence out of her mouth. On one occasion, Fisk was given
a newspaper clipping concerning the case and was told to show it to petitioner,
which she did with some accompanying statement, such as the press is 'ruining
you.' On another occasion, pursuant to instructions, Fisk told petitioner of a
conversation that she had supposedly overheard in a hall between four men whom
she thought were from the district attorney's office, in which one of the men,
as the ruse went, said: 'Getting back to the Miller case, Arthwell Hayton came
in and blew the top off the case.' Fisk also told petitioner 'I put all my trust
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One of the most frequent of prison activities is the "shakedown" of an inmate, or of his cell. This unannounced search may
prevent an escape plot, or turn up numbers of weapons which
could have been used in serious violence. It may also uncover
"contraband," variously defined in various prisons, but usually
including cigarettes, certain books, unauthorized leaflets, tobacco,
drugs, cash, and a multitude of other materials which prison officials believe indicative of an underlying inmate subculture of
violence or immorality. Tobacco, for example, is clearly the currency of most prison societies, and many cigarettes may have been
obtained as payment for regulation-breaking acts.
Thus far, no reported cases have dealt with direct challenges
to either cell searches or body searches." Several cases attemptin Mr. Bland [the sheriff] and maybe it would do some good for you if you tried
the same.' Finally, Fisk said that she had at one time been represented by an
attorney who 'did not do me much good' and indicated that perhaps petitioner
should suspect hers.
Such deliberate police deception and subversion of a defendant's rights
should not be condoned. The District Court of Appeal said in this case:
It is almost incredible that in these days of enlightened treatment
by prosecution authorities of persons charged with crime, the Peggy Fisk
incident could have occurred....
The trick attempted by* the authorities in which they apparently
hoped to obtain incriminating statements from defendant and to get her
to throw herself on the alleged mercy of the sheriff and to suspect her
own attorney was completely indefensible . . . (245 Cal. App. 2d, at
141, 143-144, 53 Cal. Rptr., at 738, 740.)
Id. at 626-27.
The plurality opinion in United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971), reaffirming the On
Lee (On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952)) and Hoffa (Hoffa v. United States, 385
U.S. 293 (1966)) rules that conversations with "decoys," whether monitored or unmonitored, are admissible because no reasonable expectation of privacy exists, may serve to
differentiate the "decoy" cases from the Lanza-type case. However, it is hard to under.
stand why the defendant has a reasonable expectation of privacy in Katz when the
conversation is disclosed by a third party, but doesn't have a reasonable expectation
when the other party to the conversation ultimately determines to "spill the beans."
Nor did the Court's opinion in White clarify that point. The issue is further confused
by the fact that the discussion of the viability of On Lee is dictum, since a majority
of the Court agreed only that defendant's conversation was not subject to Katz standards,
the conversation having occurred before the announcement of that decision. Cf. Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244 (1969).
21. In Burns v. Wilkinson, 333 F.Supp. 94 (W.D. Mo. 1971), the court dealt
peremptorily and rather disingenously with the prisoner's complaint seeking an injunction
against later cell searches, based on his assertion that his fourth amendment rights had
been violated. While purporting to recognize that the fourth amendment followed a
prisoner into the institution, the court cited two cases dealing with parolees, Brown v.
Kearney, 355 F.2d 199 (5th Cir. 1966) and United States v. Hollman, 365 F.2d 289 (3d
Cir. 1966), and then cited the Palmigiano case. In thereafter holding that no cause of
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action was stated by the complaint, the court cited Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139
(1962), discussed supra notes 14-15 and accompanying text, which was not based upon
constitutional Tights, and United States ex rel. Lombardino v. Heyd, 318 F. Supp. 648
(E.D. La. 1970), which held that evidence seized in violation of a parolee's fourth amendment rights could nevertheless be admitted at his revocation hearing. Thus, if the court
did recognize fourth amendment protection in prison, its precise scope certainly was not
articulated in the opinion, and the citations relied upon, having no bearing at all upon
the case, are similarly unilluminating.
In one case, however, the court effectively granted some relief, although not specifically requested by the plaintiffs. In McCray v. State, No. 4363 (Md. Cir. Ct., Montgomery
County, Nov. 11, 1961), the plaintiffs complained of brutality. Although finding no record
evidence to support this claim, the court ordered the adoption of rules concerning searches
of both cells and bodies. These rules are reproduced verbatim here:
VIII. SEARCHES:
1. Searches of Patients
All searches of patients by correctional officers shall be conducted with maximum respect and minimum physical discomfort to the patient. In cases of patient
non-cooperation or resistance to a search, the officer shall contact his superior
immediately for instructions; the officer shall not attempt to use force on his
own. Only items which are prohibited by the Patient Conduct Rules or the regulations of the tier to which the patient is assigned shall be confiscated.
2. Searches of Cells
All searches of cells shall be conducted with minimum disturbance to the
contents of the cell. The officer(s) conducting the search shall return all items
moved during the course of the search to their places and shall take all reasonable precautions to avoid damage to any items. Only items which are prohibited
by the Patient Conduct Rules or by the regulations of the tier to which the
patient is assigned shall be confiscated. The patient shall be present during a
search of his cell and shall be given a written list of all items which are confiscated.
3. Strip Searches
Except as provided by Disciplinary Segregation and Administrative Segregation procedures, strip searches shall be conducted only upon the written certification of the Associate Director for Custody that there is probable cause to believe
that a strip search of named patients is absolutely necessary to ensure the order
of the institution or the safety of patients or staff.
Strip searches shall be conducted with maximum courtesy, maximum respect
for the patient's dignity, and minimum physical discomfort to the patient. In
cases of patient non-cooperation or resistance, the officer shall immediately contact the Associate Director for Custody, or in his absence that person acting in
his place, for instructions; until he receives such instructions, the officer shall
not attempt to effect a search by force. Only items which are prohibited by the
Patient Conduct Rules or the regulations of the tier to which the patient is
assigned shall be confiscated.
4. Alleged Discovery of Contraband
If a patient is accused of possession of contraband, the prior notice to him
required by Rule 3A of the Disciplinary Hearing Procedures shall include a
complete list of the items allegedly found on his person or in his cell.
The only case in which a rectal search was challenged in any way is Konigsberg v. Ciccone, 285 F. Supp. 585, 593 (W.D. Mo. 1968), in which Konigsberg, having
been involved in a scuffle in the yard, was subjected to a search, for no apparent reason.
He refused to voluntarily submit to the search, because there was no medical personnel
present. The court rejected the contention that he could not be forced to submit to such
a procedure on the ground that the prison personnel did not actually touch him, but
merely compelled him to bend over long enough and far enough to allow a visual
inspection.
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ing to recover personal belongings lost in cell searches have been
filed; all have lost.22 A recent case which offers some hope here

is Katzoff v. McGinnis,23 in which the district court ordered restored Katzoff's fifty days of good time lost because a diary which
had been uncovered during a cell search referred to the warden as
a "cigar smoking SOB." Truth being no defense, the inmate had
been deprived of his good time, and thrown into a solitary confinement cell. Another, similar case, Rodriguez v. McGinnis,24
involved the discovery in the inmate's cell of several "pornographic" pictures of his wife. Again, good time was assessed; again,
the court held that the procedure by which it had been removed
violated due process.
The upshot of all these cases is that the prisoner has very
little, if any fourth amendment privacy protection as the law now
stands. Property or information, seized from his mail (Stroud),
cell (Urbano) or his person, or from the person of others (Lanza)
may be confiscated and retained, or even used against them at a
later proceeding, whether disciplinary or criminal. These cases
completely lack any attempted justification. While the Lanza
court did suggest that because surveillance "has been the order of
the day" 25 in jails, it was acceptable, that watery kind of reasoning simply cannot withstand scrutin. 26 The question, then, is
22. Urbano v. Calissi, 384 F.2d 909 (3d Cir. 1969); Gray v. Creamer, 329 F. Supp.
418 (W.D. Pa. 1971). The Fourth Circuit seems to have put an insuperable barrier in
the path of those seeking return of items taken from cells or compensation for the items,
rejecting the argument that these are "liberty" cases, and requiring instead that the
plaintiffs meet the $10,000 minimum statutory amount under 28 U.S.C. sections 1331
or 1332. See Weddle v. Director, 436 F.2d 342 (4th Cir. 1970).
23. 441 F.2d 558 (2d Cir. 1971), rev'd per curiam, No. 35253 (2d Cir., Jan. 25, 1972).
24. 307 F. Supp. 627 (N.D.N.Y. 1969), aff'd, No. 35300 (2d Cir., Jan. 25, 1972).
25. 370 U.S. 139, 143 (1962).
26. The proposition that a prisoner has less privacy because everyone knows that
there is less privacy in jail, and therefore he has no reasonable expectation of privacy is
one of the most outrageous examples of tautological thinking espoused in many years.
Nevertheless, some courts have accepted the idea, almost without any indication of
thought at all. Perhaps the most incredible case is People v. Califano, 5 Cal. App. 2d 476,
85 Cal. Rptr. 292 (2d Dist. 1970), where the court allowed the use of a tape recording
of a conversation between two codefendants, which occurred in the jail's "interview
room," because the defendant, at the start of the conversation, had said to his companion, "The cops are probably listening right now," after which there had been raucous
laughter on the part of the two. This, the court said, demonstrated that there was no
expectation of privacy on the part of the defendants. The court ignored the fact, of
course, that the two then proceeded to talk about their crime. The perversity of the
idea that the police could wiretap anyone's phone and use any information gathered
thereon simply by telling him that his phone was tapped, or even better, simply by
announcing in the paper that many phones in a given area were tapped, is apparent.
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what arguments can be raised in support of the current status of
the law.
Several reasons suggest themselves: First, it may be argued,
there is probable cause for any search, at any time, of any inmate's
possessions. The mere fact that he is in prison, it could be argued,
lends some credence to the fear that he may be in the process of
breaking yet another law, or another regulation of the prison.
Moreover, if his crime has been a violent one, he is in a community where others have been officially deprived of any right to
defend themselves; therefore, we should be extra cautious because, in contrast to the "free world," the right of self-defense
may be meaningless, or at least diluted, in the prison world. Finally, the security of the prison, as well as his own security, demands that there be some opportunity to "spot-search" him, for
weapons, contraband, or any other material deemed contrary to
prison safety.
The first position, obviously, cannot be accepted, for its acceptance would readily lead to the next proposition-that exconvicts, having once been found guilty of a crime, are more
likely to commit offences than others 27 and, therefore, should
have less protection than others from searches and seizures conducted by the proper authority.28 Additionally, in terms of violent offenders, the figures belie the premise-most inmates are
not convicted of violent crimes.2 9 It is simply not provable that
Yet the California court has accepted it on more than one occasion. See also People v.
Blair, 2 Cal. App. 3d 249, 82 Cal. Rptr. 673 (4th Dist. 1969). Surely the Katz case cannot
be so easily evaded; surely it means that wherever one would reasonably expect privacy,
he must be accorded privacy there, and cannot be deprived of that reasonable desire for
privacy simply because he is told that it is not private. That is to say, there is some
privacy the police cannot take away, at least without a warrant, no matter how explicit
the notice of non-privacy.
27. Figures on recidivism rates vary greatly, but everyone is agreed that, as President Nixon has declared, the system "presents a convincing case of failure," Memorandum
of the President of the United States to the Attorney General of the United States,
November 13, 1969, and that at least one-half and possibly as many as three-fourths of
those incarcerated will be re-incarcerated. Thus, a convincing case could be made, on a
statistical basis, that those in prison, or those released from prison, are highly likely to
return to a career of crime. Yet, obviously, there would be no basis whatsoever for taking
away from these men their clear civil liberties as persons who have "paid their debt" to
society, although courts continue to uphold civil disabilities on ex-felons. See, e.g., Green
v. Board of Elections, 380 F.2d 445 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1048 (1968);
Note, 53 VA. L. REv. 403 (1967).
28. See von Hirsch, Prediction of Criminal Conduct and Preventive Confinement
of Convicted Persons,21 BUFFALO L. Rxv. 717 (1972).
29. This varies greatly, of course, within prison systems. In those which use proba-
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such a great percentage of inmates has been convicted of violent
crimes that violence is to be more expected simply by that fact.
Finally, even when the search is for weapons, one would at least
expect that the fourth amendment test of Terry v. Ohio 30 would
give guards sufficient basis for stopping any truly dangerous inmate and searching him. But if the search is for non-dangerous
contraband, there would seem to be no reason that the officials
could not obtain at least some sort of administrative warrant before searching each inmate's personal belongings.
In their contention that the "prison atmosphere" creates a
different environment for fourth amendment rights, correctional
authorities may be somewhat justified. Here, several arguments
are open to them, supported in part at least by precedent and
reason. First, it may be suggested, the searches conducted here
are "administrative" searches, much like those approved in Camara v. Municipal Court,31 and See v. City of Seattle. 2
In those two cases, of course, the Court balanced the need of
tion very heavily, it is possible that the prison population is more violence-prone, or at
least has been connected with violent offences in the past. A study in California, for
example, has recently concluded that while 44.2% of the newly admitted inmates in that
state's prison had been convicted of homicide, robbery, assault, rape, or sex crimes in
1960, by 1968 the figure had risen to 53.8%. This, however, did not indicate that all of
these crimes were violent. REPORT OF THE SELECT CoMMrrrrEE ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUSTICE, PAROLE BOARD REFORIM IN CALIFORNIA, ORDER OUT OF CHAOS 2-3 (1970). Moreover,
the report also concluded that "if a measure of change in the characteristics of prisoners
is their probable success after release, the population received as new prison input has
not changed over the years. By this measure, the average inmate received today is no
better or no worse than the average inmate received in 1960." Id. at 23. A study of
Ohio's total inmate population in 1970, prepared by the Bureau of Statistics of the
Department of Mental Hygiene and Correction, showed that of a total inmate population
of 9,605, 4,205 (43% had been convicted of murder or manslaughter, rape robbery
(both armed and unarmed) and aggravated assault. Id. at 1. Again, these figures are
ambiguous, since many unarmed robberies, at least, may be nonviolent, while even
embezzlement and fraud, for example, might be, in some instances, connected with violence. Nevertheless, the figures indicate some general conclusions about the inmate populations. A purported breakdown of these demonstrates that only one-third of new
commitments to the Ohio System were convicted of violence offences. See DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS AND MENTAL HYGIENE, OInO's ADULT CORRECTIONAL SYSTEN, THE REPORT IN

BRIEF 2 (1970). Furthermore, since all agree that murderers, etc., are probably least likely
to recidivate (in the California study, 71% of released murderers had no new arrests for
any offense or misdemeanor, while only 13% of drug offenders were so listed), it is highly
likely that many of the 1100 murder and manslaughter offenders could be reasonably
classified as "nonviolent," at least in terms of the likihood that they will again resort
to violence. But see Bunker, War Behind the Walls, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Feb. 1972, at 39,
30. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
31. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
32. 387 U.S. 541 (1967).

PRIVACY IN PRISON

the municipality to investigate housing and health code violations
with the individual's right to privacy, and reached a compromise
position, which differentiated between homes (where a warrant
to search would be issued, generally, only upon a refusal by the
owner) and businesses (where, the Court intimated, a warrant
could be issued to cover an area, without the necessity of first
requesting permission to search without a warrant). Although
this "watered down" the fourth amendment protection in one
view, it also gave more protection than the Court had previously
allowed, in Frank v. Maryland.3 3 The Court stressed that in
either instance, an agency's decision to inspect need not be based
upon knowledge of conditions in a specific home8 4 and that
"surprise" might be a "crucial aspect of routine inspections." 3
Furthermore, the Court indicated that the mere passage of a
certain period of time might itself be sufficient to justify the issuance of administrative search warrants.3 6 It would seem, therefore, that application of the Camara-See doctrines to prison might
allow a prison to obtain a standing, continuous kind of search
warrant, allowing one search, for example, every X number of
days, and that further searches could be justified on some of the
37
bases laid out in those cases.
Second, the argument may be made that the possibility of
33. 359 U.S. 360 (1959).
34. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536 (1967).
35. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545 n.6 (1967).
36. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538-39 (1967).
37. The "home visit" case, Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), is of dubious
applicability to the jail search situation, assuming, as this article suggests should be the
case, that the fourth amendment applies to such searches. Mr. Justice Blackmun, for
the Court, went out of his way to stress, again and again, that there was no intent in
the home visit to find anything which might result in criminal prosecution: "the beneficiary's denial of permission is not a criminal act," id. at 317; "forcible entry or entry
under false pretenses or visitation outside working hours or snooping in the home are
forbidden," id. at 321; "nothing supports an inference that the desired home visit had
as its purpose the obtaining of information as to criminal activity," id. at 321; "The
visit is not one by police or uniformed authority . . . . It does not deal with crime or
with the actual or suspected perpetrators of crime." Id. at 322; "The home visit is not
a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation, and . . . is not
in aid of any criminal proceeding," id. at 323; [Camara and See, which are distinguished
in the opinion] "each concerned a true search for violations." Id. at 325. Furthermore,
the opinion clearly and unequivocally expressed no opinion on whether any evidence
found during a "home visit" could be used against the victim of the visit in any way.
Id. at 323. The only caveat might be the emphasis on the "rehabilitative" nature of the
entire welfare program, but this is probably insufficient to see his opinion as endorsing
jail searches, if they are otherwise protected by the fourth amendment.
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violence, whether from one individual or a group, is always present in a prison, that it is impossible to determine which inmates
are more likely to be contributors to the violence and, therefore,
the situation is somewhat like a continuing "emergency," in which
fourth amendment rights must be temporarily suspended. 8
And these worries are justified. The alleged use of a wig by
George Jackson to smuggle in a gun, 9 the use of a false phallus,
which could spray bullets,40 and the periodic inmate fights which
result in serious injury or death all appear to sustain the state's
burden here that the prison is an unsafe place-a place in which
both guards and inmates often fear for their own lives-which calls
for total abandonment of the niceties of the fourth amendment.
These arguments are alluring. But they fall short of justifying the continued degradation they invite upon inmates. In the
first place, even administrative searches require some outside authorization; 41 wardens seek to keep the power to determine the
frequency and breadth of such searches. Second, it may well be
suggested by police that at least some areas in the "free world"
pose as much constant danger as the prison. Third, the argument
fails to consider other means by which much of the tension in
correctional institutions can be lessened, such as classification,
separation, and even isolation, into segregated sections of the same
institution or, more desirably, into different institutions.42 This
38. See, e.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S.

294 (1967); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
39. The allegations in the Jackson case are still fuzzy. For a short, but lucid synopsis
of the case, see the Earl Caldwell story in the New York Times, Sept. 20, 1971, at I cols. 3.5.
40. See United States v. Roche, 443 F.2d 98 (10th Cir. 1971).
41. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967); cf. See v. City of Seattle, 387
U.S. 541 (1967).
42. Perhaps, we must cease talking about "the" prison, and "the" prisoners, and
begin a more careful analysis. For prisons and other correctional institutions are divided
into several classes of "security," and prisoners are sent to these different institutions
dependent upon several factors, including potential for rehabilitation, program availability, psychological factors, and the degree of danger which a classification committee believes they will pose for the other inmates and for the institution at large. Perhaps, then,
we should at least consider whether different regulations, indeed, different constitutional
standards, might not apply, at least in the terms we have been dealing with, in these
allegedly different grades of institutions.
Mail inspection provides a good example. The purpose of the inspection, we have
already determined, is to protect the inmates and the institutional staff from violence
and, as well, to prohibit contraband, at least that contraband which carries a distinct
potential for unrest, such as drugs, money, etc. In a maximum security institution, where
"escape" is theoretically filled with danger, and where inmates are not generally allowed
access to any material which might be used as a weapon except under careful scrutiny,
the argument for inspection of packages and cells becomes stronger. In a minimum,
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is clearly in keeping with modern correctional thinking, and may
well be the "less drastic alternative" " to impinging on the rights
of all the inmates in an institution. The emergency analogy,
while superficially scintillating, is simply that-superficial. Although there is undoubtedly some underlying tension in any
correctional institution all the time, this could be said of many
other places in our crowded urban life today.
Even if one were to accept these arguments, in part, as some

justification for cell searches, however, they apply in little or no
direct degree to searches of mail, searches of the body, and sei-

zures of non-dangerous contraband, such as cigarettes, pornographic pictures, etc. Assuming the right of officials, within limits
flexibly proscribed by the Constitution, to search cells, there is
no justification for helter skelter searching of incoming mail.
Furthermore, these justifications might apply with greater force
if the authorities were to limit the use of the materials found in
such searches to disciplinary measures. 44 But that is not the case.

These pieces of information, as in the Stroud case or the decoy
no-wall institution, where escape means simply a casual walk, and where residents have
ready access to hundreds of tools, etc., which could become weapons, search of packages,
at least for weapons, becomes much less justifiable. This analysis closely parallels the outside world as well. One major reason we would not tolerate random inspection of packages that go through the post office, for weapons, drugs, or anything else, is that there
are simply so many alternate routes by which one may come into possession of such items
that the inspection would seem like a gratuitous invasion of privacy, with little hope of
achieving any legitimate state end. In the prison, on the other hand, the main source of
materials is mail and other outside communication; inspection here may well cut off much
of the supply or illicit items, thereby actually achieving the state purpose.
43. The doctrine of the less drastic alternative requires that, before a state may
infringe upon fundamental civil liberties and human rights, it must show not only that
its regulation serves a compelling state interest, but, in addition, that there is no way
to achieve that interest which infringes less upon those rights. See, e.g., Wormuth &
Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH L. REv. 254 (1964); Note,
Less Drastic Means and the First Amendment, 78 YALE L.J. 464 (1969). The primary cases
in the Supreme Court are Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) and Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The doctrine has already been applied to institutions, in
Covington v. Harris, 419 F.2d 617 (D.C. Cir. 1969), where the court required that officials
of a mental institution demonstrate that maximum security confinement was the "least
drastic alternative" by which the process of treatment and incarceration could be obtained.
44. The issue of whether materials seized in an "administrative" search, where standards are less rigorous than for criminal matters, can be used in subsequent criminal
proceedings is still not resolved, but in a leading decision, Piazzola v. Watkins, 316 F. Supp.
624 (M.D. Ala. 1970), Judge Johnson invalidated the use of marijuana found in a college
dormitory in a criminal proceeding, although he had previously held in Moore v. Student
Affairs Comm., 284 F. Supp. 725 (M.D. Ala. 1968) that the evidence could be used to
expel the students. The Piazzola opinion was affirmed, 442 F.2d 284 (5th Cir. 1971). See
Turner & Daniel, Miranda in Prison: The Dilemma of Prison Discipline and Intramural
Crime, 21 BuFFALo L. REv. 759 (1972).
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situations, may lead to further prosecutions, so that even if one
were to accept the position of some courts that material seized in
violation of constitutional rights may be used in civil proceedings
but not in criminal proceedings, that would not be applicable
here.
The main fallacy of the prison arguments, however, in my
opinion, stems from another source completely: it fails to consider the rights of privacy and dignity which I believe are inherent in the constitutional protections of the ninth and fourth
amendments. Before continuing our discussion, then, let us turn
to this issue.
II.

THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY, AUTONOMY AND PRIVACY:

THE THEORY

Even if, as the Court said in Katz v. United States, 45 the

fourth amendment does not create a constitutional "general standard of privacy," it now seems clear that the right exists somewhere in the Constitution. For purposes of this discussion, we
will refer to its source as the ninth amendment. Stemming from
Griswold v. Connecticut,4 7 and moving onward, the "right to
45. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
46. I do not seek or desire to become mired in the discussion of whether the "right to
privacy" comes from the ninth amendment, the word "liberty" in the due process clause of
the fifth amendment, the "emanations" of the Bill of Rights, natural law, or natural
obstinacy. That issue split the Court wide open in Griswold, and has been the subject of
extensive discussion, both before and since that case, as the following cites demonstrate.
I use the terms "ninth amendment" and "right of privacy" simply as shorthand method;
there is no approbation contained in either. For these highly interesting, but somewhat
esoteric debates, see Beaney, The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court,
1962 Sup. CT. REv. 212; Beaney, The Griswold Case and the Expanding Right to Privacy,
1966 Wis. L. REv. 979; Dunbar, James Madison and the Ninth Amendment, 42 VA. L. Ia.
627 (1956); Franklin, Ninth Amendment as Civil Law Method and its Implications for Republican Form of Government, 40 TUL. L. REv. 487 (1966); Gross, The Concept of Privacy,
42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 34 (1967); Kelly, Clio and the Court: An Illicit Love Affair, 1965 Sup. CT.
REv. 119, 149-55; Kelsey, The Ninth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, 11 IND. L.J.
309 (1936); Kutner, The Neglected Ninth Amendment: The "Other Rights" Retained by
the People, 51 MARq. L. REv. 121 (1967); Pilpel, Birth Controland a New Birth of Freedom,
27 OHio ST. L.J. 679 (1966); Redlich, Are There "Certain Rights . . . Retained by the
People?", 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 787 (1962); Rogge, Unenumerated Rights, 47 CALIF. L. REv. 787
(1959); Symposium-Comments on the Griswold Case, 64 MIcH. L. Rnv. 197 (1965); The
Supreme Court, 1964 Term, 79 HARv. L. REv. 56, 162-65 (1965); Comment, Privacy After
Griswold: Constitutional or Natural Right?, 60 Nw. U.L. REv. 813 (1966); Comment, Ninth
Amendment Vindication of Unenumerated Fundamental Rights, 42 TEMPLE L.Q. 46
(1968); Comment, The Uncertain Renaissance of the Ninth Amendment, 33 U. Ci. L.
REv. 814 (1966); Note, The Ninth Amendment: Guidepost to Fundamental Rights, 8 WAr.
& MARY L. REv. 101 (1966); Comment, UnenumeratedRights-Substantive Due Process, the
Ninth Amendment, and John Stuart Mill, 1971 Wis. L. Rav. 922.
47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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privacy" has given its protection to people who do not want to
wear motorcycle helmets,

48

or do want to wear long hair,49 who

abortion,50

want to have an
but do not want to be sterilized, 51
and even to those who wish to see obscenity in their homes 52 or
perform "abnormal sex acts" in toilet stalls not in their own
homes.8 3
Griswold itself, of course, has been so widely discussed and
debated 54 that it would simply retread old ground to rehearse
the case in much depth here. Briefly, the Court in Griswold held,
per Mr. Justice Douglas, that a Connecticut statute forbidding
the use of contraceptives, or the giving of advice as to their use,
was unconstitutional. The grounds of the majority opinion, however, were unclear, the Court stating that the Bill of Rights created
a "penumbra" of unenumerated rights, one of which was a "zone
of privacy," 85 which the Connecticut statute transgressed. The
Court stressed that the case involved married plaintiffs and that
marriage was "a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the degree of being sacred." 56
Although Mr. Justice Douglas was ambiguous as to the source of
this "right of privacy," Mr. Justice Goldberg had a ready suggestion: the ninth amendment, he said, pointed to rights which,
although unenumerated in the first eight, were nevertheless there,
one of which was the right of privacy protected by the Court in
this case:
I do not mean to imply that the Ninth Amendment is applied
against the States by the Fourteenth. Nor do I mean to state that
the Ninth Amendment constitutes an independent source of rights
protected from infringement by either the States or the Federal
Government. Rather, the Ninth Amendment shows a belief of the
Constitution's authors that fundamental rights exist that are not

expressly enumerated in the first eight amendments and an intent
57
that the list of rights included there not be deemed exhaustive.
48. See notes 61-70, infra and accompanying text.
49.
50.

See notes 71-82, infra and accompanying text.
See notes 8-96, infra and accompanying text.

51.
52.

See Wade v. Bethesda Hospital, 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969), discussed in text accompanying notes

102-04, infra.
53. See notes 97-100, infra and accompanying text.
54. See articles cited, supra note 46.

55. 381 U.S. at 484.
56. Id. at 486.

57. Id. at 492 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
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In dissent, Mr. Justice Black, adopting his "clear meaning"
analysis, argued that since the right of privacy, or whatever other
name was given it, was not specified in the Constitution, it could
be invaded, not only when there is a counterbalancing governmental interest, but at any time, simply because it was not "prohibited by some specific constitutional provision," i a position
clearly at odds with the view of the majority 6;9-and even of the
concurrences 60-that a substantial state interest had to be demonstrated to uphold the statute.
Since 1965, Griswold has been used as an opening bar in
various kinds of cases, each suggesting a "right of privacy." One of
the fullest and most notable of these lines is the "motorcycle helmets" cases. By 1968 most states 61 had passed legislation which
required drivers of motorcycles to wear protective head gear.
These statutes were challenged in a startling number of states,
one of the primary arguments being that the legislation was aimed
at requiring the individual to protect himself. This, the argument went, was violative of his right to decide his own life, and
risk his own injury, and hence infringed on his right of privacy
protected by Griswold.
The courts almost unanimously rejected the challenges, 2
58. Id. at 510 (Black, J., dissenting).
59. See Mr. Justice Douglas' listing of earlier cases, dealing with what he clearly believed to be other kinds of "privacy" issues, at 381 U.S. 483-85, citing, e.g., NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (associational privacy); West Va. State Bd. of
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (religious beliefs); Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622
(1951) (right to be undisturbed by commercial solicitors); Public Util. Comm'n v. Pollak,
343 U.S. 451 (1952) (considering, but denying, right to be undisturbed by music and advertisements on public bus); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (right to be free from
humiliating search by police). All of these cases required, at the least, a balancing test,
and, in light of later cases, would probably now require the state to show a "compelling
state interest."
60. E.g., Mr. Justice White's thesis that the state "bears a substantial burden of
justification," 381 U.S. at 503.
61. See Note, Motorcycle Helmets and the Constitutionality of Self-Protective Legislation, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 355 nn.2-5 (1969).
62. State v. Also, 11 Ariz. App. 227, 463 P.2d 122 (1969); Penney v. North Little Rock,
248 Ark. 1158, 455 S.W.2d 132 (1970); Love v. Bell, 171 Colo. 27, 465 P.2d 118 (1970);
State v. Albertson, 93 Idaho 640, 470 P.2d 300 (1970); Wichita v. White, 205 Kan. 408, 469
P.2d 287 (1970); Everhardt v. New Orleans, 253 La. 285, 217 So. 2d 400 (1968), appeal dis.
missed and cert. denied, 395 U.S. 212 (1969); State v. Edwards, 287 Minn. 83, 177 N.W.2d 40
(1970); State v. Cushman, 451 S.W.2d 17 (Mo. 1970); State v. Darrah, 446 S.W.2d 745 (Mo.
1969); State v. Krammes, 105 N.J. Super. 345, 252 A.2d 223 (1969); State v. Mele, 103 N.J.
Super, 353, 247 A.2d 176 (1968); People v. Bielmeyer, 54 Misc. 2d 466, 282 N.Y.S.2d 797
(Sup. Ct. 1967); State v. Anderson, 3 N.C. App. 124, 164 S.E.2d 48 (1968), afJ'd, 275 N.C.
168, 166 S.E.2d 49 (1969); State v. Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969); State v. Craig,
19 Ohio App. 2d 29, 249 N.E.2d 75 (1969); Elliott v. Oklahoma City, 471 P.2d 944 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1970); State v. Fetterly, 254 Ore. 47, 456 P.2d 996 (1969); Commonwealth v.
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but most of these cases specifically refused to hold the "privacy"
argument invalid, choosing rather to find a rational state purpose
of protection of those who might be injured if a motorcycle went
out of control when its driver was hit in the head by pebbles and
rocks spun up by the tires of passing cars. 3
At least two state courts, however, attacked the argument directly, and held that state legislatures have the power to pass
statutes which make it criminal for persons not to protect themselves. 4 In both instances, the courts raised what has been called
the "necessity" argument: 65 that highway deaths had risen so
Arnold, 215 Pa. Super. 444, 258 A.2d 885 (1969); Ex parte Smith, 441 S.W.2d 544 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1969); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 128, 241 A.2d 625 (1968); State v.
Solomon, 260 A.2d 377 (Vt. 1969); Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377,
appeal dismissed, 395 U.S. 709 (1969).
63. Some courts suggested another, alternate purpose of the legislation-to prevent
injured motorcyclists from adding to overcongestion in the hospitals, and perhaps putting
themselves, and their dependents, on the welfare rolls. See, e.g., State ex rel. Colvin v.
Lombardi, 104 R.I. 128, 241 A.2d 625 (1968); State v. Acker, 26 Utah 2d 104, 485 P.2d 1038
(1971); State v. Laitinen, 77 Wash. 2d 130, 459 P.2d 789 (1969).
64. State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489 (Fla. 1969); State v. Lee, 51 Hawaii 516, 465 P.2d 573
(1970). The argument has been accepted in dictum in several cases: Commonwealth v.
Howie, 534 Mass. 769, 238 N.E.2d 373 (1968); People v. Carmichael, 56 Misc. 2d 388, 288
N.Y.S.2d 931 (1968); State v. Mele, 103 N.J. Super. 353, 247 A.2d 176 (1968); State v.
Odegaard, 165 N.W.2d 677 (N.D. 1969); State ex rel. Colvin v. Lombardi, 104 R.I. 28, 241
A.2d 625 (1968); Bisenius v. Karns, 42 Wis. 2d 42, 165 N.W.2d 377, appeal dismissed, 395
US. 709 (1969).
65. Note, supra note 61, at 376-77 (1969). The "public necessity" and "public ward"
arguments are not new, of course. The right of the state to limit, or ban, the sale
of alcoholic beverages was dealt with in the License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847).
Although the basis of the decision was that the sale was intrastate, Mr. Justice Grier's
language even then noted the right of the state to ban any article "which they believe to
be pernicious in its effects, and the cause of disease, pauperism and crime." Id. at 631.
This theme rang through the "police power" cases of the nineteenth century. The most
interesting discussion, perhaps, is found in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887), in which
the Court reaffirmed the virtual hegemony over alcoholic beverages it had earlier noted,
against challenges under the fourteenth amendment. Responding to the argument that
"liberty" within the fourteenth amendment encompassed the right to do whatever one
wished unless, and until, it "harmed" someone else, the Court said: "But by whom, or by
what authority is it to be determined whether the manufacture of particular articles of
drink, either for general use or for the personal use of the maker, will injuriously affect the
public? Power to determine such questions, so as to bind all, must exist somewhere....
Under our system that power is lodged with the legislative branch of the government."
Id. at 660-61. The same "crime, pauperism and poverty" argument was made by the Washington Supreme Court in Territory v. Ah Lim, 1 Wash. 156, 24 P. 588 (1890), where the
court, in words that could be transported whole to today's world, in upholding a law regulating the use of opium, including private use, declared: "Smoking opium . . . is an
insidious and dangerous vice, a loathsome, disgusting and degrading habit, that is becoming dangerously common with the youth of the country, and . . . its usual concomitants
are imbecility, pauperism, and crime." Id. at 590. The argument is incredibly broad, since
it would mean that a legislature need simply declare a situation one of public necessity,
and thereby protect itself from judicial reversal. The doctrine is also found in tort law.
See W. PROSSER, LAw oF ToRTS § 24, at 124-25 (4th ed. 1971), but is limited even there to

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

rapidly that the issue had become one of the "continued viability
of society." 66 And the Florida Supreme Court went further:
we ought to admit frankly that the purpose of the helmet is to
preserve the life and health of the cyclist, and for some more divinely ordained and humanely explicable purpose than the service
of the state.67
A few state courts rejected the entire notion that the state
could legislatively force an individual to protect himself, and further found wanting the proposed state interests in such legislation.
The Michigan Court of Appeals denounced the statute as leading
to "unlimited paternalism" 6 specifically basing its decision on
Griswold, the ninth amendment, and Justice Brandeis' concept
article, 0
of the "right to privacy" expressed both in his seminal
7
0
and his famous dissent in Olmstead v. United States.
Another set of cases which has raised, debated, and by no
means settled the impact of the "right of privacy" are the student
hair cases. Here, as in the motorcycle instances, the courts are
split, but the split is much more pronounced: The First, 7'
Fifth,72 (in part) Seventh, 73 and Eighth 74 Circuits have adopted
the arguments of students that the ability to wear one's hair
at any length is protected by the Griswold penumbra; the Fifth,"6
(in part) Sixth, 76 and Ninth 77 Circuits rejecting them. The District
Courts in other circuits, and even in these, are still in disarray, s
emergency situations, such as the destruction of a house to stop a raging fire, and clearly
has no direct applicability on an ongoing crisis such as that of motorcycle accidents.
66. State v. Lee, 51 Hawaii 516, 521, 465 P.2d 573,575-76 (1970).
67. State v. Eitel, 227 So. 2d 489, 490 (Fla. 1969).
68. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Davids, II Mich. App. 351, 357, 158 N.W.2d 72, 75
(1968). See also People v. Fries, 42 Ill. 2d 446, 250 N.E.2d 149 (1969); People v. Smallwood,
52 Misc. 2d 1027, 277 N.Y.S.2d 429 (1967); State v. Betts, 21 Ohio Misc. 175, 252 N.E.2d 866
(1969). For a discussion of the cases on both sides, see 67 MIcH. L. REv. 360 (1968); Note,
supra note 61; Comment, The Validity of Motorcycle Helmet Legislation, 30 U. Prr. L.
REv. 421 (1968).
69. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890).

70. 277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928).
71. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970).
72. Griffin v. Tatum, 425 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1970).
73. Crews v. Cloncs, 432 F.2d 1259 (7th Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1034 (7th
Cir. 1969).
74. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971).
75. Ferrell v. Dallas Indep. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S.

856 (1968).
76. Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970).
77. King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971).
78. Finding for the students: Berryman v. Hein, 329 F. Supp. 616 (D. Idaho 1971);
Martin v. Davison, 322 F. Supp. 318 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Axtell v. LaPenna, 323 F. Supp. 1077
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and the literature continues
to pour out, most of it favorable to
79

the claim of the students.
The different approaches to the Griswold issue may be seen
by these quotations from the First Circuit opinion in favor of the
students, and from the Ninth Circuit decision against the students. In the view of the First Circuit:
We do not say that the governance of the length and style of
one's hair is necessarily so fundamental as those substantive rights
already found implicit in the "liberty" assurance of the Due Process Clause, requiring a "compelling" showing by the state before it
may be impaired. Yet "liberty" seems to us an incomplete protection if it encompasses only the right to do momentous acts, leaving
the state free to interfere with those personal aspects of our lives
which have no direct bearing on the ability of others to enjoy their
liberty.
We think the Founding Fathers understood themselves to have

limited the government's power to intrude into this sphere of personal liberty, by reserving some powers to the people. The debate
(W.D. Pa. 1971); Parker v. Fry, 323 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971); Turley v. Adel Community School, 322 F. Supp. 402 (S.D. Iowa 1971); Lambert v. Marushi, 322 F. Supp. 326
(S.D.W. Va. 1971); Dawson v. Hillsborough County, Fla., School Bd., 822 F. Supp. 286 (M.D.
Fla. 1971); Watson v. Thompson, 321 F. Supp. 394 (E.D. Tex. 1971); Karr v. Schmidt, 320
F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Tex. 1970); Lansdale v. Tyler Junior College, 318 F. Supp. 529 (E.D. Tex.
1970); Black v. Cothren, 316 F. Supp. 468 (D. Neb. 1970); Cordova v. Chonko, 315 F. Supp.
953 (N.D. Ohio 1970); Alexander v. Thompson, 313 F. Supp. 1389 (C.D. Cal. 1970); Dunham
v. Pulsifer, 312 F. Supp. 411 (D. Vt. 1970); Reichenberg v. Nelson, 310 F. Supp. 248 (D. Neb.
1970); Sims v. Colfax Community School Dist., 307 F. Supp. 485 (S.D. Iowa 1970); Miller v.
Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94 (N.D. Ill. 1969); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F. Supp. 706 (D. Minn. 1969);
Calbillo v. San Jacinto Junior College, 305 F. Supp. 857 (S.D. Tex. 1969); Zachary v. Brown,
299 F. Supp. 1360 (N.D. Ala. 1967). In most of these cases the courts specifically found a
"right of privacy," via Griswold, for the students. Holding against the students: Rumler v.
Board of School Trustees, 327 F. Supp. 729 (D.S.C. 1971); Valdes v. Monroe County Bd. of
Pub. Inst., 325 F. Supp. 572 (S.D. Fla. 1971); Hammonds v. Shannon, 323 F. Supp. 681 (W.D.
Tex. 1971); Pound v. Holladay, 322 F. Supp. 1000 (D. Mo. 1971); Farrell v. Smith, 310
F. Supp. 732 (S.D. Me. 1970); Gere v. Stanley, 320 F. Supp. 852 (M.D. Pa. 1970); Jeffers v.
Yuba City Unified School Dist., 319 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. Cal. 1970); Southern v. Board of
Trustees, 318 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Carter v. Hodges, 317 F. Supp. 89 (W.D. Ark.
1970); Whitsell v. Tampa Indep. School Dist., 316 F. Supp. 852 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Livingston
v. Swanquist, 315 F. Supp. 1 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Corley v. Daunhauer, 312 F. Supp. 811 (E.D.
Ark. 1970); Brownlee v. Bradley County Bd. of EduL., 311 F. Supp. 1360 (E.D. Tenn.
1970); Lovelace v. Leechburg Area School Dist., 310 F. Supp. 579 (W.D. Pa. 1970); Neuhaus v. Torrey, 310 F. Supp. 192 (N.D. Cal. 1970); Wood v. Alamo Heights Indep. School
Dist., 308 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Tex.), afJ'd, 433 F.2d 355 (5th Cir. 1970); Stevenson v.
Wheeler County ld. of Educ., 306 F. Supp. 97 (S.D. Ga. 1969), afJ'd, 425 F.2d 1154 (5th
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 957 (1970); Brick v. Board of Educ., 305 F. Supp. 1316 (D.
Colo. 1969); Giangreco v. Center School Dist., 313 F. Supp. 776 (W.D. Mo. 1969).
79. Just a sample of notes on student hair cases includes: 20 ALA. L REV. 104 (1967);
18 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 143 (1969); 84 HARv. L. Rv. 1702 (1971); 55 IowA L. REv. 707 (1970);
59 Ky. L.J. 238 (1970); 70 OSoOODE HALL L.J. 293 (1969); 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 92 (1970);
23 S. CAL. L. REv. 150 (1971); 4 VAL. U.L. Rlv. 400 (1970); 1971 WASH. U.L.Q. 89.
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concerning the First Amendment is illuminating. The specification
of the right of assembly was deemed mere surplusage by some, on
the grounds that the government had no more power to restrict
assembly than it did to tell a man to wear a hat or when to get up
in the morning. The response by Page of Virginia pointed out that
even those "trivial" rights had been known to have been impaired
-to the Colonists' consternation-but that the right of assembly
ought to be specified since it was so basic to other rights. The
Founding Fathers wrote an amendment for speech and assembly;
even they did not deem it necessary to write an amendment for
personal appearance. We conclude that within the commodious concept of liberty, embracing freedoms great and small, is the right to
wear one's hair as he wishes.80
The Ninth Circuit, however, dismissed the Griswold claim virtually out of hand:
Neither Griswold or [sic] cases akin to Griswold are appropriate
here. The conduct to be regulated here is not conduct found in the
privacy of the home but in public educational institutions where
individual liberties cannot be left completely uncontrolled to clash
with similarly asserted liberties of several thousand others.81
Yet virtually all those courts which have denied relief to students,
or affirmed expulsions because of their failure to follow school
dress codes, have not simply dismissed the privacy claim; they
have sought long and hard to find justifications for the regulations. 2.
A third area in which the Griswold "privacy" argument has
been raised is abortion. Here, however, the proponents of the
doctrine have been highly successful in having the basic premise
adopted that a woman has a right to privacy and determination
over her own body, even though some courts have thereafter determined the presence of a compelling state interest to override
the individual interest. In People v. Belous, s 3 for example, the
court declared that:
80. Richards v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1284-85 (1st Cir. 1970).
81. King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932, 937 (9th Cir. 1971). The
court cited Schmerber, Breithaupt and Raderman v. Kaine for this proposition. See the
discussion at note 105, infra and accompanying text.
82. This is particularly true in the Fifth Circuit, where the key issue has been whether
the wearing of long hair has, in fact, created a school disturbance. While one may disagree
with that test, it nevertheless recognizes that the state must justify its rules. See the cases
cited, supra notes 71-78.

83. 71 Cal. 2d 954, 458 P.2d 194, 80 Cal. Rptr. 354 (1969), cert. denied sub non.
California v. Belous, 397 U.S. 915 (1970).
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The fundamental right of the woman to choose whether to bear
children follows from the Supreme Court's and this Court's repeated
acknowledgement of a 'right of privacy' or 'liberty' in matters re84
lated to marriage, family, and sex.

The argument has been accepted in several cases ruling antiabortion statutes unconstitutional, in Texas, 5 Georgia,"" South
Dakota,8 7 Wisconsin, 8 s the District of Columbia 9 and Illinois; 90
even the dissents in those cases, 9 or the majority opinions in cases
finding that the state presented a compelling state interest in such

legislation, have agreed that Griswold establishes a basic right to
92
privacy.
The exact nature of the right, and the precise basis for its
establishment, have not been clearly articulated, although the

Illinois court referred to the "woman's interest in privacy and in
control over her body," 93 and the District of Columbia court
considered that there was a clear issue of whether to "bear children." Contrary decisions have avoided this issue, by finding that
the question is not "simply whether the pregnant woman has a
fundamental right to be let alone in the control of her body processes .. . [but whether the state can] assign to the human organism in its early prenatal development as embryo and fetus a right

to be 'born' unless the condition of pregnancy directly and proximately threatens the mother's life," 94 thus posing the question
as one of protection of the fetus' life versus the mother's privacy
right.
84. Id. at 963, 458 P.2d at 199, 80 Cal. Rptr. at 359.
85. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
86. Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048 (N.D. Ga. 1970).
87. State v. Munson, No. 4481 (S.D. Cir. Ct., Pennington County, April 6, 1970).
88. Babbitz v. McCann, 312 F. Supp. 725 (E.D. Wis.), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 1
(1970).
89. United States v. Vuitch, 305 F. Supp. 1032, 1035 (D.D.C. 1969), rev'd, 400 U.S. 813
(1971).
90. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385 (N.D. Ill.
1971).
91. See, e.g., the dissent in id. at 1393.
92. See, e.g., Corkey v. Edwards, 322 F. Supp. 1248, 1251 (W.D.N.C. 1971) ("We also
agree that whether or not to bear a child is ordinarily and up to a point within the zone
of privacy of a woman and that she has the right to be let alone in making that determination.'); Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1222-23
(E.D. La. 1970).
93. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1390 (N.D. Ill. 1971).
94. Rosen v. Louisiana State Bd. of Medical Examiners, 318 F. Supp. 1217, 1224 (E.D.
La. 1970).
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The issue is currently in the Supreme Court,95 and we may
soon have some strong indications from that tribunal as to the
scope of the Griswold privacy right. But, whether the Court finds
a "compelling state interest" sufficient to outweigh the privacy
interest of the woman, or whether it evades the issue by finding
the Texas and Georgia statutes too vague,90 or takes another path
entirely, it is unlikely to erase the concept of privacy as established in Griswold, at least in these cases, which touch so closely
upon conception, contraception, sex, and the family, the precise
components of that case.
Several other cases should be mentioned in this brief survey
of the Griswold progeny. Of some importance in discerning the
impact of Katz and Griswold are the "toilet-spy" cases, in which
police officers have cut holes in ceilings above stalls and surrepticiously viewed activities in stalls in restrooms open to the public, usually in an attempt to capture persons using the stalls for
homosexual acts. Where the stalls have no doors0 7 or where the
activities could otherwise be seen, 8 the courts have held that
the view is a constitutional search; but where this is not true, the
courts have found an invasion of privacy, and have suppressed the
evidence thus obtained.9 9 In explaining the reasoning behind invalidating the "view," and relying on Griswold, the Maryland
Court of Appeals stressed the "privacy" nature of the toilet stall:
We believe that a person who enters an enclosed stall in a public
toilet, with the door closed behind him, is entitled, at least, to the
95. Roe v. Wade and Doe v. Bolton were argued before the Court on December 17,
1971. 40 U.S.L.W. 3300 (1971) carries excerpts from that argument.
96. Roe v. Wade, 314 F. Supp. 1217 (N.D. Tex. 1970); Doe v. Bolton, 319 F. Supp. 1048
(N.D. Ga. 1970). The Court took that path in the Vuitch case. See Vuitch v. United States,
400 U.S. 813 (1971).
97. People v. Heath, 266 Cal. App. 2d 754, 72 Cal. Rptr. 457 (1968); People v. Roberts,
256 Cal. App. 2d 488, 64 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1967); People v. Maldonado, 240 Cal. App. 2d 812,
50 Cal. Rptr. 45 (1966); Kirsch v. State, 10 Md. App. 565, 271 A.2d 770 (1970); State v. Kent,
29 Utah 2d 1, 432 P.2d 64 (1967); cf. Poore v. Ohio, 243 F. Supp. 777 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
98. Shaw v. Pitchess, 323 F. Supp. 784 (C.D. Cal. 1969); People v. Young, 214 Cal. App.
2d 131, 29 Cal. Rptr. 492 (1963); State v. Coyle, 181 So. 2d 671 (Fla. App. 1966).
99. Britt v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 2d 469, 374 P.2d 817, 24 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1962);
Bielicki v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 602, 374 P.2d 817, 21 Cal. Rptr. 849 (1962); Brown v.
State, 3 Md. App. 90, 238 A.2d 147 (1968); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 208, 177 N.W.2d 800
(1970). Only one case has allowed the search where the stall has been closed, and the activi-

ties would have been hidden totally from the view of one either in the restroom proper, or
the outside. Smayda v. United States, 352 F.2d 251 (9th Cir. 1965). The court relied heavily
on the theory that there was no trespass, cf. Brown v. State, supra, a theory surely put in
question since Katz. Smayda has been cited and purportedly followed, but each time in
cases to which it did not directly apply. See cases cited, supra note 97.
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modicum of privacy its design affords, certainly to the extent that
he will not be joined by an uninvited guest or spied upon by

probing eyes in a head physically intruding into the area. 10°

Finally, two other constitutional decisions should be at least
cited. In Buchanan v. Batchelor, ° ' a three judge district court,
following what it took to be the clear import of the Griswold
privacy doctrine, struck down Texas' sodomy statute as overbroad,
since it reached marital activities as well as those of other persons.
And in Stanley v. Georgia,0 2 the Supreme Court invalidated the
search and seizure of allegedly obscene materials because the defendant had possessed the items in his own house, for his own use,
and not for commercial distribution. Although relying heavily on
first amendment cases, 1°3 the Court left little doubt that the
"privacy" aspect of the case also played an important role in the
decision.104

Finding a common theme in these diverse cases is an uncomfortable and difficult task. But surely the Ninth Circuit, in allowing schools to regulate hair length of students, was correct in
saying that the simple phrase "right to privacy" does not sufficiently describe the underlying core,' 0 5 at least if we restrict the
concept of privacy to what it has generally encompassed. Rather,
it seems to me, the "ninth amendment" rights we have seen the
courts talk of here are composed of several important factors:
privacy, dignity, and self-determination. Thus it is that, almost
unnoticed, the Supreme Court has declared that the purpose of
the fourth amendment is "to protect personal privacy and dignity
against unwarranted intrusion by the State," 106 and the Illinois
court has spoken of the "woman's interest in privacy and in control over her body," and has struck down an abortion law as a
Igross intrusion on woman's privacy which [forces] her to bear an
100. Brown v. State, 3 Md. App. 90, 94, 238 A.2d 147, 149 (1968).
101. 308 F. Supp. 733 (N.D. Tex. 1970), vacated sub noma., Wade v. Buchanan, 401 U.S.
989 (1971). See also Cotner v. Henry, 394 F.2d 873 (7th Cir. 1968).
102. 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
103. Id. at 564-68.
104. Id. at 565.
105. See King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir. 1971).
106. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767 (1966) (emphasis added). See Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958), where the Court declared that the test of cruel and inhuman
punishment was "nothing less than the dignity of man." Id. at 100.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

unwanted child," 107 speaking of two separate and distinct interests.
The wearing of hair, like the wearing of a motorcycle helmet, after all, is not a "private" matter, in the sense that it occurs
in one's boudoir, and women are not complaining that they are
being asked to have their abortions done in public view. These
individuals are not concerned solely with their "privacy"; it is,
rather, their "liberty," their "autonomy," which has been transgressed by these laws. The argument is straight from Mill-one
has autonomy over himself until and unless he begins to infringe
1 08
on the autonomy of other persons.

Support for this approach can be found in Professor Bloustein's similar analysis of the tort law of invasion of privacy, 100
in which he concluded that, notwithstanding Dean Prosser's position that the right of privacy was really four separate rights, 110
all the cases could be reconciled on one principle: the right to
dignity.
The fundamental fact is that our Western culture defines individuality as including the right to be free from certain types of
intrusions. This measure of personal isolation and personal control

over the conditions of its abandonment is of the very essence of
personal freedom and dignity, is part of what our culture means
by these concepts....

I contend that the gist of the wrong . . .is not the intentional
infliction of mental distress but rather a blow to human dignity,
an assault on human personality. Eavesdropping and wiretapping,
unwanted entry into another's home, may be the occasion and the
cause of distress and embarrassment but that is not what makes
the acts of intrusion wrongful. They are wrongful because they are
demeaning of individuality and they are such whether or not they
cause emotional trauma."1 '

Although Professor Bloustein dealt briefly with privacy in
"non-tort" cases, his writing occurred before Griswold, before the
hair and motorcycle, and abortion cases, and hence he was unable
to use these decisions to buttress his argument. But surely those
107. Doe v. Scott, 321 F. Supp. 1385, 1390-91 (N.D. 111. 1971).
108. See Note, 1971 Wis. L. RPy. 922.
109. Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,
39 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 962 (1964).
110. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALiF. L. RFv.383 (1960).
111. Bloustein, supra note 109 at 973-74.

PRIVACY IN PRISON

cases support the contention that the apparent de minimis nature
of the matter overlooks the fact that at the core in all of these cases
is the fundamental concept of dignity of the individual.
Thus, the right to "privacy" is really not that at all, or at
least not that alone; the concept encompasses human autonomy
and human dignity, and that dignity is the key to understanding
both the tort and the constitutional aspects of the phrase. Certainly, this appears from the cases outlined above, in which humiliation and degradation have played a major role: it is not only
that privacy has been invaded, but that activities intended and
thought to be safe from the world have been unveiled. It is the
resultant humiliation and degradation that is the essential. Suppose, for example, that the toilet doors had swung open to disclose that the stall was being used for gambling. The privacy
invasion would be virtually the same; the door is swung open.
Yet I suggest that the reaction of the courts, and of juries, would
be different; the reason would be the lack of humiliation. Indeed,
the plaintiff in such a case would be protected only to the extent
that he could convince the jury that the viewer had no way of
knowing that gambling was being conducted, and that it was fully
possible that an act of a more private-for which read humiliating
-nature was going on.
This is why no physical trespass is necessary in the tort field
or, with the advent of Katz, in the fourth amendment area. Privacy-and humiliation-are not physical, but mental, entities: it
is all inherent in the phrase "expectation" of privacy. Thus,
whether the toilet door be open or closed, if the expectation is
there, an invasion has occurred; the only question is whether the
expectation was "reasonable." If not, in the tort field, the upshot
would be, effectively, contributory negligence; in the criminal
area, that the police activity was not "unreasonable."
This analysis places a slightly different slant on the issues
posed here thus far. For if humiliation and degradation are the
keys to whether a right of privacy exists-and they may be different for tort and constitutional purposes-then the mere fact
that a search is not forbidden by the fourth amendment does not,
ipso facto, mean that all searches are allowed by the ninth amendment. The cell search, for example, may, at times, fall within the
purpose to be furthered by, and hence within the scope of, the
fourth amendment. But it may be conducted in such a way as to
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humiliate and degrade the prisoner, so that the ninth amendment
privacy right has been violated. Suppose, for example, there is
probable cause to believe that an inmate has some contraband in
his cell. A warrantless search under these circumstances may or
may not be justified, depending on the exigencies of the moment.
But if, in the process of searching, the officers literally turn the
cell upside down, breaking and destroying objects in their wake,
I suggest that the ninth amendment privacy right-the "dignity"
of the individual-has been transgressed. While the initial intrusion into his privacy was justified, under the fourth amendment,
the second intrusion, upon his dignity and self-respect, was not; a
constitutional violation has occurred. Thus, a search may violate
both the fourth amendment, because of no probable cause, and
raise the exclusionary remedy, and at the same time, without any
more, also invade the ninth amendment privacy right, because of
the invasion, without cause, of the realm of dignity of the individual." 2 A search may also, however, be perfectly proper
within the fourth amendment, and still violate the ninth amendment. Or, in some circumstances, the search might violate the
fourth amendment and still not violate the ninth, because carried
on with proper respect for the individual, or because the individual suffers no loss of dignity. The two are complementary, but
not inexorably linked.
This discovery makes it easier for me, at least, to explain why
I find little difficulty in sustaining inspection of mail, at least in
some institutions, but react violently against the reading of mail.
The former involves very little infringement upon the person
himself, either physically or mentally. It makes no attempt to
know his private thoughts, or assess him psychologically. It is not,
in short, mental cruelty of the kind Goffman describes: there is
no apparent or clear humiliation. The latter, however, fails to
pass under the fourth-ninth-amendment right-of-privacy penumbra, for it does involve inspection of the mind, it does invade personal activities and thoughts, without achieving much, if any,
purpose.
This also makes the warrantless body search issue much
112. A good example might be Monroe v. Pape, -365 U.S. 167 (1961), where the police
first invaded the plaintiff's home in the early hours of the morning and then forced him
and his wife to stand naked while a prolonged and destructive search of the premises
occurred.
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clearer, for here, the humiliation factor is so high that no possible

state interest could legitimatize it or make it valid, even in the
most maximum of secure prisons. Clearly, the "ad hoc" body
search, which often occurs in prisons, runs at loggerheads with
the humiliation principle. One major caveat, however, must be
uttered even here: In Schmerber v. California,"3 the Court held
that the taking of blood samples by a physician from a conscious
man being treated for injuries to prove the state's charge that he
was intoxicated while driving violated neither the fifth nor the
fourth amendment. The Court ruled the search reasonable in a
five-four opinion by Mr. Justice Brennan because (a) "there was
plainly probably cause to arrest and charge petitioner"; (b) the
officer "might reasonably have believed that he was confronted
with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a warrant, under the circumstances, threatened the 'destruction of evidence' "114 and (c) "the test chosen to measure petitioner's bloodalcohol level was a reasonable one . . . performed in a reasonable
manner." 115
The Schmerber case has been viewed as qualifying, if not
overruling, the classic case of Rochin v. California116 in which
the Court struck down the use of two capsules of morphine obtained by a stomach pumping of the defendant, whom the arresting officer had seen take the capsules in an apparent attempt to
destroy evidence. Closer inspection, however, will demonstrate
that Rochin and Schmerber are different cases: (1) the evidence
in Rochin would not have been destroyed, as in Schmerber;
(2) force and violence were used in Rochin, while in Schmerber
the defendant was being treated at the time his blood was withdrawn; (3) the Court in Schmerber relied upon Breithaupt v.
Abram,' 7 another blood sample case, which had focused on the
fact that blood samples are taken every day from millions of
113. 384 US. 757 (1966).
114. The Supreme Court has itself viewed Schmerber as an "emergency" case. See, e.g.,
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30, 35 (1970). It has also, however, been viewed as involving not
"real" evidence. See Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967); United States v. Wade, 388
US. 218, 223 (1967), but that, of course, is a fifth, not a fourth amendment issue. Thus, the
only Supreme Court case to cite Schmerber as a fourth amendment precedent has done so
only on the emergency basis of the situation.
115. 384 U.S. at 771.

116. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
117.

352 U.S. 432 (1957).
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Americans.11 Whatever the status of blood samples, however,
the kind of body searches conducted by prison guards would seem
to be invalid: (1) the evidence would not be destroyed if the
guards sought a warrant; (2) there is no "treatment" occurring
when the search is made; (3) examinations of the anus, under
force, is not "so slight an intrusion as is involved in applying a
blood test" 119 to be analogous. Furthermore, the kind of "dragnet" body search often conducted in prisons seems tremendously
overbroad and, therefore, challengeable under Davis v. Mississippi'20 where the Court found invalid Mississippi's fingerprinting of virtually every young black in the area surrounding
that of the alleged crime. If even fingerprinting, which is clearly
not as intense an invasion of the body as blood sampling, can become unconstitutional when applied without any standards, or
any apparent reason, surely the normal body search of a prison
guard must be similarly invalid.
A slightly more difficult problem is posed, however, when
the kind of body search involved in Sostre or Konigsberg is at
issue. Here, the application is not general, but quite specific. And,
under the argument already articulated as to mail and package
inspection and reading, the inmate has been "classified," albeit in
a rather haphazard and probably unconstitutional way,' 2 ' as a
serious security risk. Nevertheless, under the standards laid out
in Breithaupt and Schmerber, the search is probably invalid:
(1) there is force, or implied force, applied in the search; (2)
there is little or no probable cause in connection with any specific search; (3) examinations of the anus are not typical, everyday affairs in the lives of most Americans, even those who go to
their doctors-regularly.
Additionally, the "right to privacy" protected by the ninth
amendment, or by the "penumbra" of the Bill of Rights, never
discussed in Schmerber, Rochin, Breithaupt, or any other crimi118. Id. at 436.
119. Id. at 439.
120. 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
121. In Morris v. Travisono, 310 F. Supp. 857 (D.R.I. 1970), the court held that
classification procedures must meet due process standards, and required a hearing, plus
evidence presented, plus a possibility of counsel, either legal or nonlegal, plus an opportunity to cross-examine in special instances. The court's holding is unique, but highly desirable, since classification changes carry with them changes in freedom and liberty, privileges,
opportunities for work or study release, home furloughs, etc. It is, in short, a change in the
entire environment, and should be safeguarded by due process protections.
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nal opinion (unless, perhaps, Katz can be said to deal indirectly
with the concept), intensifies the belief that the search is illegal:
the grossness of the invasion of the body cavities far outweighs
any possible benefit which the prison might derive from this particular search. For in Breithaupt in Rochin, and in Schmerber,

there was strong cause, if not hore, to believe that this defendant,
at this time, had-committed a crime; there is no basis for such a
belief when a defendant in administrative confinement returns
from exercise in the yard, or when a prisoner returns from a
visit. Whatever "probable cause" requires, and that, of course, is
a world of many greys, it is not present here.
Thus, we return to our beginning: that the purpose of
prison today seems virtually one of degradation by design. As Dr.
Willard Gaylin has described today's "correctional institutions":
For purposes of security it is essential that the population remain divided. To that end it is necessary that a sense of community
be discouraged, that communication among prisoners be made difficult; that leaders, natural or potential, be isolated; that passivity
be encouraged and assertiveness, which is too close to aggressiveness, be restricted even if it might be applied to positive ends; that
self-confidence be eroded and self-doubts be engendered; that prejudices and biases which divide the community be encouraged or at
least tolerated; that sources that feed pride be restricted, because
pride is potential power; that lethargy be rewarded; that individuality be obliterated; that the spirit of man be broken in the service of obedience. 12
This distortion of the role which prisons should play must
be rejected: the purpose of the prison should be protection, security and rehabilitation; whatever its present practice it should
not be an instrument of degradation and a perpetrator of dehumanization. When the balance between the interest of the state
in protecting both inmates and institution and the interest of the
individual (and the state) in retaining his human dignity is close,
the weight must be swung in favor of the inmate, since breakdown
of security is often exaggerated, while the deterioration of human
pride and soul in prison is well-attested.' 23 Moreover, by restoring the dignity of the inmate, we are likely to decrease the poten122. W.
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(1971)..
123. See the discussion note 126, infra, concerning the burden of proof and persuasion
in "fundamental liberties" cases.
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tial security problem, while a decision in favor of security can
only decrease the humanity of the resident.
The most difficult issue under this analysis is the cell search.
Here, the invasion is not physical in the same sense as the body
search; consequently the humiliation factor would seem to be less
intense. On the other hand, a physical intrusion of sorts into the
domain of the inmate has occurred, without any clear probable
cause; the evidence sought, in most cases, is unlikely to be destroyed; and the danger, in most instances, is not immediate. Of
course, each search, or mass search, as the case usually is, would
have to be judged on its own merits; a warden who "senses" an
impending riot and searches for weapons will probably be vindicated, under the "emergency," or "disappearing evidence" theory.

24

Many cell block searches, however, are not conducted in any
real attempt to thwart immediate danger. Indeed, most correctional officers will admit that, at least in maximum security institutions, many of the inmates have some kind of weapon at
virtually all times. Thus, the usual "search" is neither for purposes of discovering weapons, or for preventing bloodshed; it is a
"functional" search-it "keeps the inmates uncertain" and "on
their toes." Recently in one institution I know, the warden conducted a mass search of cells every day for three weeks. The reason
was not to find new weapons the men had concocted during the
one day lapse, or to uncover new caches of cigarettes won in the
gambling that previous night. The search had one purpose-to
show the inmates who was boss in the prison.
That kind of search, it seems to me, is of dubious constitutional validity. More importantly, it is of dubious correctional
efficiency and desirability. Inmates, like the guards and the wardens, understand the necessity of occasional searches; indeed, as
we shall discuss in Part Three of this article, they sometimes desire a search. But daily searches go beyond protection of either
the institution or the inmates, and the inmates know that-they
begin to resent the "Man," who is obviously using his power just
to use his power.
In summary, the right to privacy, protected by the fourth
and ninth amendments, should apply in prison, and there are
124. See cases cited, supra note 38.
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hints that it soon will be there. When it does arrive, the courts
will be faced with at least three kinds of "searches": (1) inspection of packages and mail; (2) body searches conducted (a) at
the whim of the guards; (b) before certain inmates are allowed
to exercise or before any inmate is allowed to visit, and after he
returns; (3) cell searches. The first seems defensible under the
current fourth amendment law. The second is of dubious validity,
and the "privacy and humiliation" factors of the "ninth amendment" right of privacy tips the balance against those kinds of
searches without a specific warrant. The third poses the most difficult issue, and will have to be decided on a case by case basis. In
determining the validity of the search, the court should pay particular attention to the manner in which the search was conducted, and the purported purpose of the search. The more raucous
the search, and the more apparently intended for intimidation
purposes, the more willing the court should be to strike it down.
III.

THE RIGHT TO DIGNITY:

TENTATIVE APPLICATIONS

IN PIUSON

The basic premise of the argument made under this "penumbra" is that each human being has a right to his individuality
and uniqueness, and that state actions which infringe upon this
dignity and privacy 1- must be justified by a compelling state
interest.1 26 The question then posed, is whether specific restric-

tions on the right to dignity may be justified in terms of the goals
and interests of the prison.
125. We speak here only of constitutional rights of privacy, not of the tort concept
enunciated by Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REv. 193 (1890), and
expounded at length since. E.g., Feinberg, Recent Developments in the Law of Privacy, 48
COLUM. L. REV. 713 (1948); Green, Right of Privacy,27 ILL. L. REV. 237 (1932); Lisle, Right
of Privacy (A Contra View), 19 Ky. LJ. 137 (1931); Nizer, Right of Privacy: A Half Century's Developments, 39 MIcH. L. RFv. 526 (1941); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. Rxv. 383
(1960), except to the extent that these cases reinforce the view that dignity and autonomy
are inherent components of the right to privacy, which then becomes protected from
governmental invasion by the ninth amendment. See Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of
Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean Prosser,39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 962 (1964).
126. It seems clear that the compelling state interest test applies. The Court in Griswold cited several cases, including NAACP v. Alabama, 377 US. 288 (1964), in which that
basic test had been used. Mr. Justice Goldberg specifically declared the test to be applicable. 381 U.S. at 497 (1965). At least this much can clearly be said: all the courts have
rejected the Griswold position taken by Mr. Justice Black that the state need prove nothing
at all because the rights are not specfically enumerated. See cases cited and discussed, supra
notes 61-63, 68, 71-78, 83-94, and accompanying text. Many of those cases either specifically
or implicitly adopt the compelling state interest test; only a few reject the standard
explicitly.
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The Hair Cases127

A.

Like students, inmates have had a great deal of difficulty establishing any right, of any kind, to determine their own appearance. The incredible difficulty which courts have had over this
simple issue, and the fact that the controversies continue to inundate the courts 128 demonstrates, perhaps, that the Eighth Circuit
correctly summarized the issue as not one of "purpose" of the
institution, but rather of "ideology" and, even more base, authoritarianism:
A recent law review has concluded, after summarizing the
cases,
'What is-disturbing is the inescapable feeling that
long hair is simply not a source of significant distraction,
and that school officials are often acting on the basis of
personal distaste amplified by an overzealous belief in the
need for regulations.' 84 Harv. L. Rev. 1702 at 1715 (1971).
The connection between long hair and the immemorial problems of misdirected student activism and negativism . . .is diffi-

cult to see. No evidence has been presented that hair is the cause .
*

.

.Accepting as true the testimony that in St. Charles, Missouri,

the longer the student's hair, the lower his grade in mathematics, it
does not lead me to believe that shortening the one will add to the
other. Indeed, the very fact that such evidence is offered would
seem to support the periodical's conclusion. 129
Most of the suits by prisoners to strike down hair regulations
have been unsuccessful,' 0 the courts docilely accepting the pris-

ons' arguments that this is interference with prison discipline 181
127.

See cases cited, supra notes 71-82.

128. Id.
129. Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069, 1077 (8th Cir. 1971) (Aldrich, J., concurring).
130. Daugherty v. Reagan, 446 F.2d 75 (9th Cir. 1971) ("We have not reached the point
,where we second guess the state authorities on the length of prisoners' hair."); Blake v.
Pryse, 444 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1971); Brooks v. Wainwright, 428 F.2d 652 (5th Cir. 1970);
Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970); Rails v. Wolfe, 321 F. Supp. 867 (D.
Neb.), aff'd, 448 F.2d 778 (8th Cir. 1971).
131. Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970). In early prisoner cases, of all
types, both state and federal courts refused even to consider complaints about activities in
the prisons. This view, dubbed the "hands off" doctrine, was justified on innumerable
grounds: the management of the prison was an executive function, and review would
-violate the separation of powers doctrine; prison authorities inherently had unreviewable
-discretion; there was no possible way to grant relief; the complaints were "unjusticiable";
.the officials had sovereign immunity. When state prisoners sought relief in federal courts,
these spectres were joined by the ghosts of federalism: abstention, exhaustion, and comity.
The early history was reviewed and thoroughly criticized in Comment, Beyond the Ken of
the Courts: A Critique of Judicial Refusal to Review the Complaints of Convicts, 72 YAtE
.LJ.
506 (1963). See also Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners:The Developing Law, 110
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or that short hair is necessary for identification of the prisoner,132
or that health considerations lead -to the regulations. 33 Although
one court and one attorney general have determined that hair
regulations do indeed infringe upon constitutional rights of privacy, 3 4 the clear weight of authority is the other way.
Amazingly, none of these opinions discuss, in any detail, the
genesis of hair and clothing regulations in prison, merely acquiescing in the authorities' views that these are necessary for the
maintenance of discipline and order. These regulations were begun over 150 years ago, however, with only one purpose in mindthe degradation and humiliation of the inmate:
Humiliation was one of the objectives of early prison treatment. One reason for prison stripes was to degrade the prisoners.
This form of garb was introduced in New York prisons in 1815.
Prison inmates in some states were obliged to wear garish clothing
of varying hues. In Massachusetts the clothing was half red and
half blue for first offenders; second timers were red, yellow, and
blue; and third termers a costume of yellow, black and blue. Conspicuous clothing makes escapes more difficult. The shaving of
heads or of just one half was and is still used . . .135
This remains the general purpose of these regulations today: the
uniformity reduces the inmate's individuality, makes him more
malleable, and hence less volatile. But it also reduces his humanity, removes his uniqueness, and impinges on his dignity.
U. PA. L. REV. 985 (1962). But the law has changed drastically-so much so that the Supreme
Court, in unequivocal language, abolished the need for state prisoners to exhaust any
remedies before coming to federal court. Wilvording v. Swenson, 40 U.S.L.W. 3277 (US.
1971). For some comments on the demise of "hands off," see Gallington, Prison Disciplinary
Decisions, 60 J. CGat. L.C. & P.S. 152 (1969); Jacob, Prison Discipline and Inmate Rights,
5 HAuv. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LiB. L. Rxv. 227 (1970); Mueller, Punishment, Corrections, and
the Law, 45 NEB. L. REv. 58 (1966). See Vogelman, Prison Restrictions-PrisonerRights, 59
J. CRIM. L.C. 9- P.S. 386 (1968).
182. Blake v. Pryse, 444 F.2d 218 (8th Cir. 1971).
133. Brown v. Wainwright, 419 F.2d 1376 (5th Cir. 1970); Blake v. Pryse, 315 F. Supp.
625 (D. Me. 1970). But see Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971). Intriguingly,
the school authorities have apparently stopped arguing that long hair on boys is a health
menace, since girls are obviously allowed to wear their hair long. This embarrassing fact,
of course, is not directly observable in prison, allowing prison officials to continue to voice
such an argument. Of course, lice and bedbugs may indeed be present in abundance in
prison. See, e.g., Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 98 (N.D. Ohio 1971); Commonwealth
ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, Nos. 353, 354 (Philadelphia. County Ct. of C.P., Aug. 11, 1970),
aff'd, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971), but the solution would seem to be a good exterminator,
not a good barber.
134. The Attorney General of Washington issued an opinion to that effect in 1971. See
50 N.C.C.D. Newsletter No. 4, at 10, col. 2 (Sept.-Oct. 1971).
1Z5. H. BARNES & N. TEarms, NEW HosuzoNs IN CRIMINOLOGY 851 (3d ed. 1959).
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Recently, watching a disciplinary court proceeding where an inmate was given five days in solitary confinement (suspended) for
refusing to have his hair cropped to virtual "Yul Brynner" length,
I asked the captain of the prison security force why he felt it necessary to enforce such hair regulations. His answer was disarmingly candid and naive: "You should have seen them 20 years
ago," he said, "they were just like a military unit; all the same
hair length, the same uniform. They marched up and down in
the yard and really put on a show." That he was the commanding
general in such a show did not specifically occur to the speaker,
although his position was obvious, as was his discomfort with the
movement away from rigid uniformity. The court in Bishop v.
Colaw 136 would have been no less accurate had it been speaking
of the captain of the guard who spoke to me that day.
That prisons can function without demeaning men by making them wear uniforms or by shearing their hair, seems eminently
obvious, particularly since there are prisons which do not have
such restrictions, 137 the most well-known being the Washington
State Penitentiary, in Walla Walla, where inmates have virtually
become co-managers of the prison with the warden, in a startling
move toward innovative thinking. 138 The Walla Walla experiment is, of course, new and tenuous, but it seems to be working.
B.

Visits
A visit to an inmate can be humiliating and degrading for
both the inmate and his visitor. After waiting for long periods of
time, 39 the visitor is sometimes searched, as is any material she
or he brings with him for the inmate. The visitor is then virtually
shoved into a cramped, crowded, noisy room, sometimes separated
by a wire, or even glass, barrier, from the inmate. In most institutions, the entire meeting is watched carefully by a guard, who
136.

450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971). See text accompanying supra note 129.

137. See supra note 134.
138. The experiment in self-determination at Walla Walla State Prison in Washington
has set the correctional world on its feet, agog at the (so far successful) spectacle of inmates
running their own lives, within "the system," handing out punishments, etc. There is no
official description of the project yet, but the inmates have formed the resident government
council, which has issued a 10-page news release and letter on the subject. See N.Y. Times,
Oct. 18, 1971, at 24, col. 1. For a description of how one such attempt succeeded, only to fall
apart with the departure of the innovating warden, see Murton, Inmate Self.Government,
6 U. SAN FRANCIsco L. REV. 87 (1971).
139. In May, 1970, waits were sometimes three hours long in the New York City system.
N.Y. Times, May 26, 1970, at 30, cols. 14.
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eavesdrops assiduously to every word of the conversation. The
time of the visit is clocked meticulously, and the visitor escorted
140
vigorously away from the inmate at the end of the allotted time.

Moreover, the prisoner and his visitor may be precluded by
prison regulation from seeing each other more than once, or perhaps twice, a month, for short periods of time. In 1971, the situation in Ohio, for example, was as follows:
A second problem concerning visitation privileges related to

the rule that no visitor may visit an inmate more than one or two
(depending on the institution) times per month. This creates a serious problem for the many inmates who receive visits from only one
person or who have only one person whose visits they really cherish.
For example, suppose that the only person who visits Inmate 'X'
at LOCI is Mrs. 'X'; that both very much look forward to her
visits; and that Mrs. 'X' would visit at least once a week if permitted. Under the present rules, 'X' will see his wife only twice a
month and he will receive no other visits. 14 '
Moreover, most institutions in the country restrict those
whom an inmate may see to certain persons (and limit even that
number), who are investigated by the state or federal authorities, thus precluding a "chance" visit by a friend who happens to
be in the area. Furthermore, it is frequently difficult for an inmate to change the names on his list, which is established when

he arrives at the institution. Since he may be there several years,
the list may become outdated, thus effectively barring him from
receiving visits from anyone.

These types of restrictions and degradations stem from the
nineteenth century concept that prisoners should be kept isolated
from the outside community.142 Indeed, many of the institutions
still in use are built in the wilderness, perhaps hundreds of miles

from the nearest large community, 43 thereby frustrating even
140. See, e.g., H. BARNES & N. TEERTERS, NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 506-09 (3d ed.
1959).
141. Ohio Citizens' Task Force on Corrections, Final Report D19 (1971).
142. Whether this was due to a fear that the community would adversely affect the
inmate's progress toward rehabilitation, or vice-versa, need not detain us here.
143. Attica, of course, springs readily to mind. In 1971, Ohio finished construction on
a 30 million dollar facility, located in a remote corner of the state, prompting one federal
judge in the state to remark: "the official policy of the State of Ohio is that the standards of
punishment which prevailed in medieval times are to be followed in dealing with those
convicted of crimes. Insofar as possible, they are to be removed to remote places, and confined in harsh and forbidding prisons. In constructing its newest prison facility, the State
selected one of its most sparsely populated areas as a site, and a medieval French prison as
the basic model for the building." Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio
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the most dedicated of visitors, particularly discriminating against
the poor.144
Rooted in the nineteenth century desire to degrade and dehumanize the inmates, these practices would be quaint reminders
of that time and philosophy-if they were not still in force. But
their very existence as we turn toward the twenty-first century is
a blemish on the name of all that is commendable-or becoming
commendable-in corrections. To expect rehabilitation of any
kind from this kind of treatment is, of course, absurd. Yet it is
clear that humanitarian visiting practices may be a major part of
a rehabilitation effort. Consider, for example, this description of
the visiting facilities at Chino state institution in California:
Stepping over to a couple seated in chairs under a tree [a visitor] said:

'What do you think of the visiting privilege here at Chino?'
'Oh, I think they're wonderful,' the husband said, 'My wife
hasn't missed a Sunday in nineteenth months and I really believe
that has kept us together. She brings a fine lunch that she prepares
herself...' .
1971). The Citizens' Task Force, supra note 141 at A2, before the prison was even in use,
agreed: "The Lucasville institution is archaic, already obsolete, and recognized as a testimonial to the ignorance of corrections in the nineteenth century, of which it is an ex-

cellent example."
Late in 1971, Senator Birch Bayh introduced a bill which would subsidize the abolition
of all prisons built in rural communities, endorsing the concept of community corrections,
See S.2535, 117 CoNe. REc. 14,453 (daily ed. Sept. 17, 1971).
144. N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1971, at 42, cols. 1-8:
Inmates at Auburn can have visitors once a week from 9 A.M. to 3:30 P.M.
But visitors who come considerable distances (New York City, about 300 miles
away, is home to many of the prison's 1,550 inmates) may be given permission to
visit on both Saturday and Sunday. For Mrs. Jackson, like most wives, the expense
of visiting is so costily for them that months can go by between visits. She last saw
her husband in September, before his transfer to Auburn, and doubts that she will
be able to afford the trip again soon.
I can tell you this as a fact. I used to travel, with my four children in
tow, from Queens, by bus, subway and railroad to Ossining. When I had
cab fare, we rode from the station to the prison, otherwise we five walked.
Twice after making the trip all the way up there, we were refused a visit
because we were not familiar with the rules requiring a special pass for
an extra visit. I have seen this happen for many people and it is sad to
see an older person, particularly, make the trip in vain.
Many families go on welfare in order to survive. In the past, discretionary
funds were available to enable a wife to visit her husband to keep the family
together. At present, a flat sum is paid, and a visit, if one is to be made, must
come out of daily expenses, which often means not eating.
The only way I can afford to make the trip is by bus and not often
then. I travel all night coming and going so that I won't have to pay for
a room, but that means I can only be with my husband one day.
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'Well, how does this differ from other places?'
'Oh, there's all the difference in the world. Here you don't
have an armed guard on the wall looking down your neck. You
don't have that hemmend-in feeling. Here you feel like a man,
again.'
'I think it's wonderful too' the wife said. 'It used to take me
fourteen hours to travel five hundred miles north to see him for
just one short hour, then fourteen hours back again. You can't
think of anything to say in one hour. I was half scared and we just
sat and looked at each other across a counter.'1 45
Thus far, the courts have been unkind to those who seek to
remove barriers to visitors, or to eliminate the myriad of indignities to which both inmates and visitors are subjected, 146 but perhaps the analysis offered here will alleviate some of that reluctance
to bring correctional institutions into consonance with correctional thinking.
Much more difficult, as a practical matter, but a much more
fertile field in terms of legal doctrine, is the explosive issue of
conjugal visitation. Although conjugal visiting is virtually nonexistent in the United States, it is practiced in many countries.
Columbus Hopper, in his superb study of the Mississippi program of conjugal visitation, 147 reports that, of sixty countries
responding to a questionnaire, thirty-one allowed either conjugal
visiting or home furlough. Of these, twelve allowed conjugal
visiting in some form.
The programs in these countries vary widely. In Sweden, for
example, both home furlough and in-prison visitation is allowed,
and used widely. Conjugal visits are generally allowed once a
month, and home furloughs are oused frequently. In the Soviet
Union, wives are brought to the prison for a period of several days,
at government expense. Argentina's program has been praised by
two distinguished penologists, as "perhaps the most dignified type
145.

K.

SCUDDER, PRISONERS ARE PEOPLE

159 (1952).

146. Seale v. Manson, 326 F. Supp. 1375 (D. Conn. 1971); Almond v. Kent, 321 F. Supp.
1225 (W.D. Va. 1970) (dictum); cf. United States ex rel. Raymond v. Rundle, 276 F. Supp.
637 (E.D. Pa. 1967) (visits to inmates on death row). One court, however, has indicated
sensitiveness to the issue. In Dixon v. Attorney General, 325 F. Supp. 966 (M.D. Pa. 1971),
the court, while not deciding on this ground, noted that transfer of plaintiffs to an institution remote from both Philadelphia and Pittsburgh would restrict the opportunity of
relatives to visit, and therefore imposed strict due process requirements on hearings before
transfer.

147.

C.

HOPPER, SEX IN PRISON

5-6 (1969).
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of conjugal visiting." 148 Columbia, Chile, and Puerto Rico also
provide for conjugal visitation inside the prison.
India, Burma, the Philippines, and several others permit
family colonies-a kind of perpetual conjugal visitation where the
family of the prisoner lives with him in some residential area specially established for this kind of program. Undoubtedly the most
famous of these is Mexico's Tres Marias Colony, located on a small
island 90 miles off the nation's Pacific coast. The inmates are generally those who have long records of offenses, particularly violent
offenses. A prisoner is given complete freedom on the island, and
he may establish himself in any business which is viable.1 49 Yet
conjugal visiting has never been widely accepted, or even experimented with, in the United States. Aside from Mississippi's
program, 50 the result of historical accident, and a few sporadic
151 and elsewhere, the idea simply has
experiments in California
52
received.
well
not been
Some have suggested that this is a response to the image of
sexual activity occurring in the prison,153 but it would appear
more likely to be simply another manifestation of the power
which correctional officers exercise over the private lives of their
charges, a power which allows them to require a probationer or
parolee to obtain permission before being married,154 or to for-

148. H. BARNES & N. TaEPs,NEW HORIZONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 511 (3d ed. 1959).
149. The program is traced in Jewell, Mexico's Tres Marias Penal Colony, 48 J. CRM.
L.C.& P.S. 410 (1958).
150. C. HosP'.R, SEX IN PRISON (1969).
151. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Feb. 14, 1971, at 69, col. I (Soledad); N.Y. Times, Aug. 4,
1968, at 57, cols. 1-5 (Tehachapi). A report of the California Board of Corrections recently
urged that conjugal visiting be extended to all its prisons. CALIFORNIA BOARD OF ,CoRcETIONS, INSrrrUTIONs 41 (1971).

152. Bills favoring conjugal visiting have been introduced in Michigan, where one is
still pending, and in Wisconsin, where the bill was killed in committee. 1 PRISONERS' RIGHTS
NEWSLETTER 17-19 (Sept. 1971).
153. Conjugal visits in prisons are not compatible with mores of the United
States, since they seem to emphasize only the physical satisfactions of sex. Home
leaves and family residence in prison colonies place the emphasis on the whole
complex of married life and family relationships-psychological and social as well
as sexual. In the countries surveyed, much more so than in the United States, the
trend is toward expansion of total family contacts.
Cavan & Zemans, MaritalRelationships of Prisonersin Twenty-Eight Countries, 49 J. CRIM.
L.C. & P.S. 133, 139 (1958).
154. State v. Black, 289 Minn. 508, 183 N.W.2d 774 (1971). Although reversing a lower
court decision upholding revocation of probation for violation of a condition that required

approval of probation officer before marriage, because there was no evidence that the
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bid a husband and wife from seeing each other because they have
both been connected with drugs.155 In short, the continuation
of this oppression, this infringement of the marital relationship,
seems to stem not from an innate abhorrence of the idea that the
prison would become, as many wardens like to put it, a "public
whorehouse," but rather from the continuation of the status quo
in which correctional officers and administrators simply feel their
power.
Moreover, the suggestion that prisons might become whorehouses if conjugal visitation was allowed misses the essence of the
program. By far the great preponderance of those who have been
involved agree that, while sexual relations are important in the
overall context, the really important aspect of such visitation is
the ability of the couple to continue to work and think together:
While most people who hear of conjugal visiting think of sexual release as the only function of the practice, those who participate in the program speak first of the freedom of visiting in private
with their wives and of being able to talk intimately and frankly
to them without fear of being heard by the prison authorities.
probationer, who had obtained a marriage license, actually intended to marry before asking
the officer's permission, the Supreme Court of Minnesota, in dictum, declared that:
We decline to hold that a requirement that defendant secure approval of his probation agent before getting married offends public policy. We find this a reasonable
condition which is directed not only at defendant's rehabilitation but at the protection of his prospective wife and children as well. It is enough to say that there
may be situations where marriage compounds rather than resolves a probationer's
problems. Until and unless he is economically and psychologically capable of supporting a family, it is proper to forbid his marriage, and in so doing he is denied
no constitutional rights.
Id. at 509, 183 N.W.2d at 775.
In the District of Columbia, an inmate was denied the right to marry his girlfriend,

although she was then pregnant with his child, and both families approved. He filed suit,
Parman v. Montilla, Civ. No. 469-70 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 17, 1970). No decision has yet been
rendered.
155. In re Peeler, 266 Cal. App. 2d 511, 72 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1968). Holding that a trial
court may order a probationer not to associate with any reputed users of marijuana or
other drugs during the probation period, even though this meant that she could not live
with her husband, who was currently charged with several drug counts, the court in Peeler,
declaring that it was deciding only the facts of this case, first noted that narcotics was one
of the most serious problems facing the country and, secondly, that the separation would be
even more severe if the court had sent the defendant to prison, rather than put her on
probation.
The weakness in the reasoning, of course, is that the greater power does not always
contain the lesser. The court must demonstrate some reason for sending people to prison,
and, likewise, must show some reason for its incredible intrusion into the marriage contract.
Although, admittedly, the court did discuss these problems at length, it failed to grasp
sufficiently the impact of what it was doing. See also Akamine v. Murphy, 108 Cal. App. 294,
238 P.2d 606 (1st Dist. 1951).
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They emphasize the emotional satisfaction rather than the physical
satisfaction. A man who had been out of prison for more than three
years after serving a sentence for robbery and who appeared to be,
in his words, 'over the hill as far as crime is concerned,' spoke
with great appreciation in his voice about the conjugal visiting
program:
It was the only thing I had to look forward to while
I was in Parchman. Believe me, I never knew how much
my wife meant to me until I went to prison. She visited
me every visiting day. She would encourage me and tell
me I could make it. I was really blue when I first went to
Parchman. I'll never forget the first time my wife visited
me. I cried like a baby. But that first visit really helped
me. I felt like a different man. It was a comfort knowing
I could be with my wife on visiting day. Truthfully, I
don't think I could have made it without her help.1 60
Remarkably, only one reported challenge to the absence of
conjugal visitation has been made since Griswold, and it was rejected out of hand, without any discussion at all.15 7 In light of

the fact that even the narrowest holding of Griswold provides the
marital relationship with a constitutional sanctity it never had
before, the paucity of challenges is intriguing. Perhaps it is because the likelihood of success, particularly if one focuses solely
on the sexual outlet, is weak; but if the analysis of this paper is
correct, and the ninth amendment grants to each individual the
right to dignity and autonomy, subject only to the state's demonstrating a compelling state interest in removing his individuality

and his relationships, it would seem that the state might have
some difficulty, at least in some instances, in defending a total
denial of all such visitation rights.
C. Homosexual Rapes
,IIOne final area of indignity in prison should be mentioned
before this tentative exploration terminates: the right to be free
from sexual assaults in the prison. For if there is anything more
'demeaning, more at odds with the dignity and privacy which this
paper suggests should be the present, almost dominant, theme in
prison, it must be to be a victim of a prison rape.
156. C. HOPPER, SEX IN PRISON 103-04 (1969).
157. Tarlton v. Clark, 441 F.2d 384 (5th Cir. 1971). Unsuccessful challenges have been
based on the theory that the marriage contract has been abrogated by the state, In re
Flowers, 292 F. Supp. 390 (E.D. Wis. 1968) and by a wife, claiming her marital rights have
been infringed, Payne v. District of Columbia Commissioners, 253 F.2d 867 (D.C. Cir. 1958).
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That homosexuality is rampant in our prisons is evident.
Barnes and Teeters report a letter they received from Dr. Kinsey
on the matter:
I may indicate that we have never gathered histories from any
male institution in which fewer than thirty-five per cent of the inmates were involved in homo-sexual relations while they were in
the institution. We have never secured histories from any long-term
institution in which fewer than sixty percent of the men were engaged in such activity and in one such institution we had over
ninety per cent of the inmates admit such experience within the
institution. Until prison authorities comprehend the magnitude of
this problem, it is possible to be totally unrealistic in attempting
15 s
to cope with it.

The most thorough and thoughtful study of the problem
thus far, conducted in the Philadelphia jail and van system in
1968, reached the following monstrous conclusions:
We found that sexual assaults in the Philadelphia prison system are epidemic. As Superintendent Hendrick and three of the
wardens admitted, virtually every slightly-built young man committed by the courts is sexually approached within a day or two
after his admission to prison. Many of these young men are repeatedly raped by gangs of inmates. Others, because of the threat of
gang rape, seek protection by entering into a homosexual relationship with an individual tormentor. Only the tougher and more
hardened young men, and those few so obviously frail that they are
immediately locked up for their own protection, escape homosexual
rape.
After a young man has been raped, he is marked as a sexual
victim for the duration of his confinement. This mark follows him
from institution to institution. Many of these young men return to
their communities ashamed, and full of hatred.
A witness describes the ordeal of William McNichol, 24 years
old and mentally disturbed:
That was June 11th, I was assigned to E Dorm. Right
after the light went out I saw this colored male, Cheyenne
-I think his last name is Boone. He went over and was
talking to this kid and slapped him in the face with a belt.
He was saying come on back with us and the kid kept saying I don't want to. After being slapped with the belt he
walked back with Cheyenne and another colored fellow
named Horse. They were walking him back into E Dorm.
They were telling him to put his hand down and stop
158.
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crying so the guard will not know what is going on. I
looked up a couple of times. They had the kid on the
floor. About 12 fellows took turns with him. This went on
for about two hours.
After this he came back to his bed and he was crying
and he stated that 'They all took turns on me.' He laid
there for about 20 minutes and Cheyenne came over to
the kid's bed and pulled his pants down and got on top of
him and raped him again. When he got done Horse did it
again and then about four or five others got on him.
While one of the guys was on him, raping him, Horse
came over and said, 'Open your mouth and suck on this
and don't bite it.' He then put his penis in his mouth and
made him suck on it. The kid was hollering that he was
gagging and Horse stated, 'you better not bite it or I will
kick your teeth out.'
While they had this kid they also had a kid named
William in another section in E Dorm. He had his pants
off and he was bent over and they were taking turns on
him. This was Horse, Cheyenne, and about seven other
colored fellows. Two of the seven were brothers.
Horse came back and stated, 'Boy, I got two virgins
in one night. Maybe I should make it three.' At this time
he was standing over me. I stated, 'What are you looking
at?' and he said 'We'll save him for tomorrow night.'
During the 26th-month period, we found there had been 156
sexual assaults that could be documented and substantiatedthrough institutional records, polygraph examinations, or other
corroboration. Seven of the assaults took place in the sheriff's van,
149 in the prisons. Of the sexual assaults, 82 consisted of buggery;
19 of fellatio; and 55 of attempts and coercive solicitations to commit sexual acts. There were assaults on at least 97 different victims
by at least 176 different aggressors. With unidentified victims and
aggressors, there were 109 different victims and 276 different aggressors.
For various reasons, these figures represent only the top of the
iceberg.
Our investigators, as mentioned, interviewed only a twentieth
of the inmates who passed through the prison system. We discovered 94 assaults-excluding those reported in institutional records.
This suggests that if all 60,000 inmates had been interviewed, 20
times 94-or 1880-additional assaults would have come to light.' 50
159. Davis, Sexual Assaults in the Philadelphia Prison System and Sheriff's Vans, 6
TRANs-ACTION 8, 9-11 (Dec. 1968).
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In 1970, a
Holmesburg Jail
tary, and unable
men incarcerated

lower court in Philadelphia, in holding the
unconstitutional, because it was unsafe, unsanito protect the bodies, lives, and dignity of the
there, found the situation relatively unchanged:

With respect to sexual assaults: In September, 1968, a Special
Master reported that sexual assaults were epidemic in the prison.
In the opinion of the Superintendent, the assaults have been 'substantially reduced.' (N.T. 101-03.) However, they remain prevalent.
One witness, when he was confined in G. Block during June, 1970,
(N.T. 326), saw 4 different prisoners homosexually raped, at least
2 of these rapes involving 2 persons raping 1 prisoner. (N.T. 32834.) He saw assaults both by penetration of the rectum and of the
mouth. (N.T. 335.) Generally, the assaults are on a new prisoner
who is meek or weak. (N.T. 335.) In addition, this witness saw 4
or 5 consensual acts of sodomy. (N.T. 334.) Another witness, when
confined in B Block from March to June, 1970, (N.T. 368), saw
two prisoners sexually attacking a kid, while a third prisoner stood
by. (N.T. 384.) Another witness, when confined in B Block in July,
1970, was asked by a prisoner to submit to sexual intercourse, and
when he refused, was told 'some people were going to mess me up,
and he said if I gave I would be protected.' (N.T. 399-400.) Another witness had advances made to him by his cell mate on B
Block; upon his request he was promptly transferred to another

cell. (N.T. 370.) A witness who was a prisoner on A Block saw 'a
little fellow . . . quite timid' sexually attacked by 1 of a group of

about 5 prisoners. (N.T. 455-56.) Such attacks occur during the
day, when the cells are open, and at the far end of the cell block,
which is not always patrolled by the guards. The victim is dragged

into an open cell while a prisoner acts as a lookout. (N.T. 331-35;
457.) Without doubt many such assaults are not reported. (Cf. N.T.
457.)160

Why do sexual assaults continue at such a rapid pace, when
all penologists know they are there, know that they occur all the
time and, in fact, will often assert, at least in prison, that most inmate fighting stems from homosexual activities of one kind or
another, either because some inmate does not wish to become a
punk, or because a triangle has developed, and one of the participants takes it upon himself to eliminate the third party? How is
it that this frightful, hideous assault on the person, not to mention the dignity, of the inmate, is allowed to continue?
160. Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, Nos. 353, 354 (Philadelphia County
Ct. C.P., Aug. 11, 1970), afj'd, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971).
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One answer is apathy and indifference:
Many guards discouraged complaints by indicating that they

did not want to be bothered. One victim screamed for over an
hour while he was being gang-raped in his cell; the block guard
ignored the screams and laughed at the victim when the rape was
over. The inmates who reported this passed a polygraph examination. The guard who had been named refused to take the test.
Then too, some guards put pressure on victims not to complain-such complaints, after all, would indicate that the guards
were failing in their duty. We found many cases where victims,
after filing complaints, had 'voluntarily' refused to prosecute, and
a number of them told us that guards urged them to rely on prison
discipline rather than to bring the facts out into the open. Very
often, these guards asked the victim if he wanted his parents and
friends to find out about his humiliation.

Without prompting from the prison guards, many victims and
their families wanted to avoid the shame and dishonor they believed would follow such a complaint.' 0 '

1
Another possible answer, accepted by at least one court,

2

is that keepers simply do not have the manpower, or the resources,
to protect against all assaults, and therefore, unless it can be

clearly shown that the keeper knew that the assailant was likely
to assault this particular inmate, there is no recourse. The thought
of that defense being accepted in a non-prison setting is an impossible one for me. The issue, however, is currently being litigated again, in another court, with essentially the same facts. 1 3
Because of the difficulties involved in such proof, and the
consequent inability to recover, other courts have viewed other
possible remedies-such as transfer 164-as more effective. Recently, the Missouri Supreme Court was faced with yet another
issue: whether fear of a homosexual attack could be a defense to a
charge of escape. The court, however, found that while the de161. Davis, supra note 159, at 11-12. The casualness with which homosexuality is
viewed by officials is reflected by the report of the Ohio Citizens' Task Force on Corrections,
Final Report C72-73 (1971): that "[s]ome [inmates] called attention to their records of court
calls for fighting as tangible evidence of their resistance to intimidation. Nearly all suggested that they were specifically instructed by staff and other inmates, a part of their
unofficial orientation to institutional life, that they would either have to fight to protect
themselves or submit to these indignities."
162. Kish v. County of Milwaukee, 441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971). The same issues, of
course, are also present in a "normal" assault, but these cases will not be discussed here.
163. Combs v. Kennedy, No. 70-C-285(2) (E.D. Mo., filed June 10, 1970).
164. Commonwealth ex rel. Bryant v. Hendrick, 444 Pa. 83, 280 A.2d 110 (1971).
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fense might be valid in some instances, there was no factual support for the defense in the present case.1 5
The issue of homosexuality in the prisons, the attempts to
reduce its frequency, and the liability of the prison for the obvious infringements upon the person, dignity, and privacy of the
victim, could be discussed at length; this brief glimpse at the
issue was merely to suggest that it, too, might be dealt with as a
branch of the "right to privacy and dignity" in prisons.
CONCLUSION

Our prisons are institutions which strive to dehumanize.
That was their purpose in the nineteenth century and, with few
exceptions, it continues to drive the prisons, their personnel, and
their policies, in the last third of the twentieth century. We expose the inmate to indignities and invasions of privacy which, if
they occurred in the "outside" world, would bring immediate
howls of protest. Of course, there are legitimate security needs of
the prisons, and these must be considered when weighing the prisoners' rights of integrity, autonomy, privacy. But our prisons are
not meant for security: their chief purpose is, and should be, re-habilitation. It is impossible to rehabilitate a man when everything around him tells him, repeatedly, that he is not a man, that
he has no humanity. It is not by chance that one of the chief
complaints of the prisoner is that he is not "treated like a man."
This paper has dealt only with obvious and blatant assaults
upon the dignity and autonomy of the people inside our correctional institutions. Perhaps that is a wrong focus, since the small
harassments and hassles, such as hourly bed checks, with flashlights in the face, or batons across the bars, or a lost pass, or a
"missed" phone call, can be every bit as demeaning, and dehumanizing, as the larger ones. But those "incidents" may fall along with
the large abuses; if they survive, however, it may take, quite simply but quite impossibly, a new breed of prison personnel. This
paper, at any rate, is simply an exploratory essay, suggesting at
least one possible approach-the Griswold privacy approach-to
the issue.
165. State v. Green, 470 S.W.2d 565 (Mo. 1971). A vigorous dissent challenged this factual finding; the majority in effect held that since there was a span of three hours between
the threat and the escape, the inmate could have notified officials, a possibility deemed
chimerical by the dissent.
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There is no clear direction, of course, as to where one is to
look to determine the composition of the wine to be poured into
the Griswold bottle. If history and antiquity are to be our sole
guides, then prisoners will have some difficulty in establishing the
kinds of rights which have been suggested here. But the abortion
cases, at least, and Griswold and Stanley, as well as the long list of
search and seizure cases which overruled history, would seem to
belie that path. Instead, it is highly probable, as many suggested
immediately after Griswold, that the "fundamental liberties" of
the ninth amendment will find their substance in the imaginations and good common sense of the nine Justices, and the lower
courts. If that is to be the case, the courts must be pointed toward
a new view of prisons, and prisoners, if they are to become receptive to the idea that prisoners have a right to dignity, privacy, and
autonomy.

